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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introducing the problem in question 
From the 24th of March to the 10th of June 1999 1 NATO conducted a military 
operation in The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the alleged purpose of putting 
an end to the gross violations of human rights carried out in the Kosovo province by 
the Serbian regime. Contemporary international law prohibits such violations of 
human rights committed by a state against individuals under its sovereignty. These 
duties are state obligations owed erga omnes to the world community as a whole and 
all states may be said to have legal interest in their protection and the right to resort 
to countermeasures to respond to those violations.2 Countermeasures are acts of 
retaliation, traditionally known as ‘reprisals’.3 This may imply suspension of treaty 
obligations by the injured state towards the responsible state, economical and 
political sanctions and under certain conditions unilateral coercive actions.4 The 
scope of reactions third states are allowed to resort to in the face of violations of such 
obligations is however not clear under current international law. The Court remarked 
in the Barcelona Traction case that “the instruments which embody human rights do 
not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such 
rights irrespectively of their nationality.”5  And, as expressed in the International 
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts6 art. 50 I. A), the right to resort to countermeasures, “shall not 
                                                 
1 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 65 
2 Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) (1970) ICJ Reports 3 p. 32, International Law 
Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 48 I b), 
GA Res. 56/83 
3 Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge London and New York 
(1997) p. 271 
4 Ibid. 
5 Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) (1970) ICJ Reports 3, p. 47 
6 GA Res. 56/83 
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affect…[t]he obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.”7   
 
The question is whether the use of force to protect the compliance with human rights 
obligations is prohibited under international law, thus posing a limit to the 
countermeasures to which states may resort.   
 
Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim has expressed the problem in these words: 
 
“when a state commits cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to 
deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, the matter 
ceases to be of sole concern to that state and even intervention in the interest of humanity 
might be legally permissible”. 8 
 
However, the United Nations Charter proscribes in art 2 (4) a broad prohibition on 
the use of force between states, the only two exceptions set in the Charter itself being 
the use of force in self-defence (art. 51) and the collective use of force authorised by 
the Security Council (Chapter 7). 9 None of the exceptions were applicable to the 
NATO-action. Shortly after the conflict, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan encapsulated the questions brought to the for by the conflict:  
 
“This year’s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions about the legal 
consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority: on the one 
hand, is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the 
other, is it permissible that gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave 
humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?” 
                                                 
7 The Draft is generally considered to reflect customary international law on the matter, Brownlie, I. 
(ed), “Basic documents in international law”, 5th ed, Oxford University press (2002) p. 300 
8 Oppenheim, “ International Law” (Robert Jennings and Arrthur Watts (eds) 9th edn; London: 
Longham, 1996), p. 44 
9 It is debated in international legal doctrine whether customary law subsisting next to the treaty 
provides further exceptions. The debate mainly focuses on an “inherent right to self-defense”, which is 
broader and different from the one regulated in art. 51. This question will not be discussed here. 
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In the Report of the Secretary General, the Kosovo-conflict was specified to 
demonstrate the general  “dilemma of…[unilateral] humanitarian intervention: The 
questionable legitimacy of an action taken without U.N. authorization, on the one 
hand, and the imperative of ”halting gross violations of human rights”, on the 
other.”10 It had been the inability of the international community to reconcile these 
two competing interests that resulted in the “tragedy” in Kosovo.11  
 
In all events, the Kosovo-conflict has revived the debate on an international legal 
doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention. This topic has been the object of a 
longstanding controversy in international law and remains so today. It concerns not 
only the application of the relevant legal norms, but also the method used to identify 
them. The tension between two fundamental principles of international law underpins 
the problem: on the one hand, the cardinal principle of sovereign equality of states, 
which in its traditional form dictates non-intervention and non-use of force. On the 
other hand, respect for human rights as a universal obligation. Humanitarian 
intervention clashes with these principles as the use of force becomes necessary to 
ensure the respect of human rights within a sovereign state. It thus also conflicts the 
desire of “positive peace”, i.e. the realization of justice, with “negative peace”, i.e. 
the absence of armed conflict? 
 
The task of this study is to analyse the possible legality under international law of 
such operations undertaken in apparent violation of the legal regime on the use of 
force established in the Charter of the United Nations, notably the prohibition of 
force in art. 2 (4). The central and principal question is whether art. 2 (4) should be 
understood to ban all use of force not explicitly allowed for in the Charter and thus 
prohibit unilateral humanitarian intervention, or whether it contains a qualification 
that does not encompass a forceful intervention on humanitarian grounds. Section 1.5 
                                                 
10 “Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess, 4th plan. 
Mtg., UN Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999) 
11 Zacklin, R.  “The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention”, Virginia Journal of International 
law, Vol. 41:4 p. 929 
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gives a more detailed plan for the legal discussion. Initially, section 1.2 attempts to 
define the concept of unilateral humanitarian intervention.  
 
1.2 “Unilateral humanitarian intervention” 
“Unilateral humanitarian intervention” is not an exact legal concept. No codified or 
universally accepted definition of what humanitarian intervention is exists. The 
notion has in legal doctrine been given multiple meanings and the legal implications 
of the concept are by no means universally accepted, thus hindering the formation of 
a normative definition in customary international law.  
 
There are essentially three recurring situations that in international legal doctrine 
have been categorized under the heading “humanitarian intervention.”12 The first is 
“humanitarian emergency help”, which is provided in cases of disasters without the 
approval of the state where the disaster takes place.13 The second is enforcement 
actions for humanitarian purposes that are carried out under the umbrella of Chapter 
7 of the UN Charter. The third is the threat or use of force by a state or group of 
states against a third state in reaction to gross human rights violations, in the absence 
of an authorization from the Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. 
 
This study limits the concept of unilateral humanitarian intervention to the third 
situation and suggests the following definition: ”unilateral humanitarian 
intervention” is the coercive military intervention by one or more states within the 
domestic sphere of another state with the purpose of preventing or putting an end to 
gross violations of human rights, without a Security Council mandate to do so. This 
is how unilateral humanitarian intervention is understood in its classical sense and 
                                                 
12 Beyerlin, U. “Humanitarian Intervention”, in Bernhardt R. (Ed.), “Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law”, Vol. 3 at 212 (1992). 
13 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 763 
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corresponds to the conception of humanitarian intervention the legality of which is 
heatedly debated under contemporary international law.14 
 
By opting for this definition, we exclude some less controversial issues that have 
been and very well be subsumed under the concept’s broad wording. The following 
paragraphs clarify the reasons for such exclusion and justify the definition outlined in 
more detail. 
 
The term “intervention” can literally mean any kind of interference within the affairs 
of another state ranging from bare verbal statements or claims about domestic 
policies, to economic or diplomatic actions and in the gravest sense, the application 
or threat of armed force.  
 
To fall within the scope of the above definition, the interference must be coercive 
and involve the use of armed force. These two qualifications rule out that any 
interference of a non – violent character and any interference that is requested from 
or accepted by the target state answer the definition.15 Thus, economic or diplomatic 
interventions in a state, hereunder “humanitarian emergency assistance”16, fall 
outside the scope of humanitarian interventions, independently of consent from the 
                                                 
14 See eg. Definition by Ian Brownlie in “Humanitarian intervention” in John Moore (ed) Law and 
Civil War in the Modern world (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University press, 1974) p. 217: 
“the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an international organization, 
with the object of protecting human rights”; Farer, T.J., ”An inquiry into the legitimacy of 
Humanitarian intervention”, in L. Damrosch and D. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New 
International order (1991) p. 15: “is the threat or use of force against another state for the purpose of 
terminating the latter’s abuse of its own nationals legal in international law?”  
15  For a more detailed account on the actions that we thereby exclude, see Harhoff, F. “Unauthorised 
Humanitarian Interventions – Armed Violence in the Name of Humanity?”, Nordic Journal of 
International Law 70:65-119 (2001) p.71, Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the 
Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 122 with further references.  
16 Such operations include the provision of humanitarian aid to civilians in a state. According to ICJ’s 
ruling in the Nicaragua case, they do not amount to intervention and are legal as long as they are 
limited to their purpose, Miltary and Paramilitary Activities Case, ICJ Reports 1986, para 242 et seq. 
See also Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 122. and 
Ryniker, A. “The ICRC’s position on “humanitarian intervention”, IRRC June 2001, vol. 83 No 842 
at 529 
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third state. The same applies to forcible intervention on the request from the third 
state. An example of the latter is the Belgo-American operation in Stanleyville in 
1964.17  
 
Furthermore, the intervention must have “the purpose of preventing or putting an end 
to gross violations of human rights.” This gives rise to two questions: What is “gross 
violations of human rights” and to what extent does the presence of other motives, 
additional to the pure humanitarian ones, disqualify the action from being labelled 
“humanitarian intervention”?  
 
Regarding the latter question, the reality of world politics and international relations 
makes it effectively impossible to demand 100 % purity of humanitarian motives. 
Legal theory therefore puts forward that the predominant or the primary purpose of 
the operation must be humanitarian.18  Consequently, political or economical aims 
will disqualify an operation as “humanitarian intervention” unless they are less 
relevant than the humanitarian objectives.19  The way in which this criterion is to be 
tested is discussed in section 5.4.3.2. 
 
The requirement of dominance of humanitarian motives is necessary for three 
reasons: firstly, it is a logic corollary of the very nature of the concept; for an action 
to be conceptualised and analysed as a humanitarian intervention, it has to be aimed 
at remedying the humanitarian catastrophe which motivated the action from the 
outset. If not, it must be regarded as an act of aggression clearly violating the 
prohibition of force in the UN Charter art. 2 (4), unless it is justified on other 
grounds.  Secondly, the means of armed force demands us to show constraint and 
                                                 
17 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 764 
18 See Murphy, S.D. “Humanitarian intervention – The United Nations in an Evolving World Order” 
(1996) p. 15, Brenfors M.,  Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, 
Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 479 
19 Ibid. 
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caution when outlining the situations in which an intervention can be accepted.20 
Thirdly, allowing the intervention to be based on utterly mixed motives would 
represent a great risk of abuse of the doctrine where states with the power do so 
intervene for their own political or economical motives.21     
 
According to the definition, only “gross violation of human rights” can constitute 
grounds for an intervention. What human rights violations that are above and below 
this threshold is not at all clear. In 1905, Oppenheim argued that violations must take 
place “in such a way as to…shock the conscience of mankind.”22 Wheeler similarly 
argues for the existence of a “supreme humanitarian emergency.”23 However, there is 
no consensus upon an objective definition of this category. 
 
The content of this category of human rights violations cannot depend upon a moral 
judgment as to which human rights are worthy of protection and which are not. Nor 
is it a pure moral question as to which human rights that are considered grave or 
serious enough to justify that the sovereignty of the state that perpetrates the 
atrocities is violated. Few contest that all violations of human rights deserve 
protection regardless of their gravity and that all human rights are of main concern to 
the world community as a whole.24 Likewise, most people would agree that the 
protection of human rights has stronger moral foundations than the territorial 
integrity of the state where the intervention takes place. The question in our context 
is: what human rights violations are considered qua international law sufficiently 
grave to require humanitarian intervention?  
 
                                                 
20 See example Harhoff, F. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions – Armed Violence in the Name 
of Humanity?”, Nordic Journal of International Law 70:65-119 (2001) p. 73.  
21 See Brenfors M. Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 479 note 151. See section 3.2.3 about the risk of 
abuse as an argument against the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
22 Oppenheim, International law, vol. 1, Longmans & Co., 1905, p. 101 
23 Wheeler, N. J.  “Saving Strangers”, Oxford University Press (2002) p. 34 
24 See section 3.2.2. 
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However, as there is no authoritative definition of “humanitarian intervention” and 
no agreement upon its legality, there is no doctrinal statement as to which human 
rights violations that can be forcefully prevented or halted. A fundamental 
consideration is: since humanitarian intervention consists, effectively, in the legal use 
of force, by the universal community as a whole (though, arguably and subsidiarily, 
also by one or more states), against domestic violations of human rights, legal 
coherence commands that such use of force should be limited to repress only 
violations of legal obligations due to mankind as a whole. In determining this 
qualifying threshold, the concept of erga omnes, introduced by the ICJ in the obiter 
dictum in the Barcelona Traction Case25, is a natural staring-point. In its ruling, the 
Court referred to obligations erga omnes, which translated literally, means “as 
against all”26: 
 
“[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In the 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have legal interest in 
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
  34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the 
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination…”27 
 
Based on the Court’s ruling, two elements can be deduced from the concept: 
universality, i.e. their binding character on all states, and solidarity, i.e. the legal 
interest of every state in their protection. However, the Court adopted no 
authoritative list or precise definition of what meaning that is attached to the 
definition.  There are immediately strong developments in current international law 
                                                 
25 Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) (1970) ICJ Reports 3 para. 33.  
26 Byers, M. “Custom, Power and the Power of Rules”, Cambridge University Press (1999) p. 195 
27 Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) (1970) ICJ Reports 3 para 34.  
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towards establishing a customary law code of what represents the gravest violations 
of human rights with equal concern to all states and individuals. 
With reference to the Barcelona Traction case, the International Law Commission in 
its Draft on State Responsibility (1980) introduced “international crimes” as a 
category of international wrongful acts.28 The category included, inter alia, acts of 
genocide, aggression, apartheid and slavery. The purpose was to categorize the most 
serious violations of international law, those which, in the line of the Barcelona 
Traction case, are of the interest to the international community as a whole.29 The 
draft article 19 and the term “crime”, however, were subject to vast criticism for 
penalizing the state responsibility. In the International Law Commission 2001 Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts30 art. 19 was 
abandoned. Instead the new art. 40 reads, under the Chapter heading “Serious 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law”: 
1. This Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious 
breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law. 
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure 
by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation. 
The term “peremptory norm” of international law refers to the concept of jus cogens, 
defined in art. 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties as “a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Jus cogens 
is thus “compelling” law and holds the highest hierarchical position among all other 
norms and principles.  
                                                 
28 International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility 1980 art. 19, (1980) ILC 
Yearbook, vol. 2, part. 2, p. 26 
29 Dixon & McCorquodale, “Cases and materials in international law”, Blackstone press limited, 1991 
(3rd.ed) p. 436 
30 GA Res. 56/83 
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The international legal doctrine is not clear as to which rules that fall under this 
category. However, there seems to be general agreement upon the prohibition of 
force, genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of the right of 
people to self-determination and of racial discrimination.31 Thus, there is reason to 
hold that the abandonment of “international crimes” in favour of “breaches of 
obligations under peremptory norms of general international law” did not in reality 
alter the nature or classification of the most serious violations of international law or 
the regime of state responsibility.32  
The concept and category of erga omnes obligations and jus cogens norms are often 
presented as two sides of the same coin, and obligations deriving from jus cogens are 
presumably erga omnes.33 Erga omnes, it is argued, is a consequence of a given 
international crime having risen to the level of jus cogens.34  Accordingly, the 
content of the concepts are largely overlapping. In this context, it is also worth noting 
the crimes that according to the statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Art. 5 of the ICC statute reads: 
“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to the following crimes:  
a) The crime of genocide;  
b) Crimes against humanity;  
c) War crimes;  
                                                 
31 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ 
Rep. 1951, p. 15 at p. 23, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge 
London and New York (1997) p. 58, Brownlie, I. “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford (1998) 5th edition p. 515, see especially his notes 28, 29, 30 with numerous references 
to legal writing and practice from the International Court of Justice. 
32 Wyler, E. “From State Crime” to Responsibility for “Serious breaches of Obligations under 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law”, EJIL, Vol. 13, no. 5 (2002) p. 1147 et.seq. argues 
for this. 
33 Ragazzi, M.  “The concept of international obligations erga omnes”, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1997) p. 72.  
34 Bassiouni C.M.  “International crimes, Jus cogens and Obligatio Erga omnes”, http://www.sos-
attentats.org/juridique/etudes_articles/27.pdf.  This is however not undisputed in the legal 
doctrine, see ibid note 34  p. 271  
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d) The crime of aggression.”35 
   
As explicitly enshrined in the article, the jurisdiction is limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The nature of the acts 
under the court’s jurisdiction thus resembles the nature of the concepts of jus cogens 
and erga omnes outlined above. Indeed, the crimes in a), b) and d) are all jus cogens 
norms and erga omnes obligations. Similarly, the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1993)36 
subjects, inter alia, war crimes (art.3), genocide (art. 3) and crimes against humanity 
(art.5) to its jurisdiction. 
  
When jus cogens, erga omnes and international crimes are viewed together, they 
reflect what acts the world community considers the gravest of crimes, acts that by 
their nature are against mankind as a whole, from which no one should go 
unpunished and to the protection of which all states must have legal standing.  The 
development of these concepts thus provides evidence of an emerging customary law 
code on what human rights violations that, as specified in the definition above, are 
due to mankind as a whole, and thus potentially could justify a unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. Current international law must be held to include at least 
genocide, slavery and crimes against humanity in this category, but the further scope 
is yet unclear. 
 
Furthermore, the definition used in this work implies that any use of force would not 
be added to or interfere with an international conflict. Humanitarian purpose would 
otherwise clearly interact with political motives; the idea that involvement in a 
                                                 
35 Rome Statue of The International Criminal Court 1998, 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm art. 5, emphasize added 
36 SC Res. 827 (1993) 
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border-transcending conflict could take place without loosing the neutrality a 
humanitarian intervention is supposed to assume is an illusion.37  
 
However, not all armed coercive interventions with humanitarian purposes that fall 
within the scope outlined above are embraced by our definition. “Rescue operations”, 
i.e. interventions to rescue nationals of the intervening state abroad, are generally 
considered to fall outside the scope of humanitarian intervention38 as they pose less 
problems from the sovereignty point of view and use of force. An example is the 
Israeli operation on the airport of Entebbe in 1976.39 The legality of such operations 
should be examined in the context of self-defence or self-help and must be held 
distinct from our discussion. 40 
  
The definition furthermore expressly limits its scope to humanitarian interventions 
undertaken on the independent initiative of one state or a group of states absent of 
Security Council authorisation. This is what makes the action a unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
Actions carried out upon authorisation from the UN Security Council, often referred 
to as collective humanitarian intervention41, are not encompassed. The two categories 
are substantially similar as both are forceful actions to prevent or put an end to gross 
human rights violations. However, to distinguish between them is crucial in legal 
terms. 
                                                 
37 Harhoff, F. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Inteventions – Armed Violence in the Name of 
Humanity?”, Nordic Journal of International Law 70:65-119 (2001) p. 73 
38 see inter alia Rytter, J.E.  “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San 
Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001), p. 
122 with further references.  See the explanation Ibid. in note 4. See section 5 
39 Blockmans, S.  “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 764, see further section 5.4 
40  Charney, J “Commentary: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo”, Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational law, Vol. 32, Nov. 1999, no. 5 p. 1235 with further references in note 19, Schachter, 
O. “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1991) p.  143-149.  
41 See Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 122 in note 4 
and p. 123 
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There is no doubt that interventions which take the form of international actions 
aiming to cope with humanitarian emergencies of this kind are legal under current 
international law if carried out pursuant to a mandate from the UN Security Council 
acting under Chapter 7 of the Charter.42 One example is the UN intervention in 
Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992). The on-going clan-
based civil war threatened almost 4.5 million of the country’s 6 million population 
with severe malnutrition and related diseases by October 1992.43 A massive flow of 
refugees was on the brink of starvation and the internal conflict made the provision 
of humanitarian assistance difficult. On the 29 November the Secretary General 
advised the Security Council that the only way in which relief operations could 
continue was through resort to enforcement provisions under Chapter 7 of the 
Charter.44 On the 3 December the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 
794, stating that the Council,  
 
“Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, 
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security… 
  10. Acting under Chapter 7…authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States 
cooperating to implement the offer [by the United States to organize and lead an operation] 
to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”45  
                                                 
42 See inter alia, Malanchuk (Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, 
Routledge London and New York (1997). P. 221), Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry 
into Law and Morality”, Transnational Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (1997) p. 
225, Simma, B. “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal aspects, 10 EJIL (1999) no. 1, p. 1, p. 4 
 4, Brenfors M. Petersen M.  “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 450 with further references and Rytter, J.E. 
“Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo – and 
Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 123 with further references. 
43 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 141 
44 Keesing’s (1992) p. 39218. 
45 SC Res 794 (1992) 
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The operation in Somalia is later characterised by the Secretary-General as a 
“precedent in the history of the United Nations: it [the Security Council] decided for 
the first time to intervene military for strictly humanitarian purposes.”46 
 
The Charter has not, however, established any explicit mechanisms for unilateral 
action involving the use of force. We must draw the distinctions between the two 
categories of humanitarian intervention. 
 
An intervention can only be considered authorised if the Council explicitly mandates 
the use of force prior to the beginning of an action. A clear example is the Security 
Council Resolution 794 (1992) authorising the action in Somalia in 1992. A 
determination by the Council that a Chapter 7 situation  (“a threat to international 
peace and security”) exists cannot substitute a formal authorisation to the use of 
force.47  Accordingly, the Security Council determination of a threat to peace and 
security in the Kosovo region in resolution 1199 (1998)48 did not authorize NATO to 
use force to remedy this threat.49  Neither can a subsequent de facto acceptance by 
the Council.  
 
Three incidents of interventions in the post war period are commonly referred to as 
examples of interventions that are best compatible with the scope of this definition. 
These are the Indian action in Bangladesh (1971), which helped the people to secure 
independence from Pakistan and to end repression, the Tanzanian action in Uganda 
                                                 
46 [1993] UNYB 51, referred in Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press 
(2001) note 250  p. 142 
47 The system of Chapter 7 of the Charter show that an art. 39 determination of threat to peace cannot 
legally justify an armed intervention. The legal ground for this must be an explicit authorization, cf. 
art. 42, after which the Security Council is given monopoly on the decision of the use of force outside 
situations of self-defense.  See Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: 
From San Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 
(2001) p .123. See further section 5.4 
48 SC Res 119 (1998) preamble, paras 1-2 
49 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 206 and 214. Indeed, as 
Chesterman notes: “this was evident in the manner in which the resolutions were said to support the 
action: no state argued that the resolutions actually authorized an enforcement action, or that the 
resolutions on their own constituted a legal basis for the intervention; they were relied on instead to 
provide a political justification for military action, ibid p. 214. See further infra section 5. 
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(1979), which led to the overthrow of Idi Amin and the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia (1978), which lead to the overthrow of Pol Pot.50 The clearest post cold 
war case of unilateral humanitarian intervention is the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
to overthrow the repressive Serbian regime. These interventions are discussed under 
section 5.  
 
1.3 A brief account of the legal position of humanitarian intervention prior to 
the enactment of the United Nations Charter 
 
“I approve…decidedly of the opinion of those who say that the cause of the Spaniards is just 
when they make war upon the Indians, who practised abominable lewdness even with beasts, 
and who ate human flesh, slaying men for that purpose. For such sins are contrary to human 
nature.”51 
        - A. Gentili 
 
The purpose of this section is to put the issue of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
into a historical setting and thereby attempt to clarify the legal position of this 
concept prior to the UN Charter. The latter is necessary because some of the 
proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention base their arguments partly on a 
pre-Charter doctrine.52 
 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention can be traced back to the 16th and 17th 
century classical legal writers on international law, like Grotius, Suares, Vattel and 
Gentili.53 They supported the notion of sovereignty, but as natural law theorists they 
                                                 
50 Gray, C.  “International Law and the Use of Force”, Oxford University Press (2000) p. 26 
51 A. Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (J.C. Rolfe trans., 1933) p. 122 
52 See especially section 4 
53 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 125, Harhoff, 
F. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Inteventions – Armed Violence in the Name of Humanity?”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 70:65-119 (2001) p. 80. 
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held the view that fundamental principles of humanity restrain the law54, thereby 
legitimating forcible interventions to protect a people from maltreatment by their 
sovereign. As Grotius put forward in his “just war” theory: “Certainly it is undoubted 
that ever since civil societies were formed, the ruler of each claimed some special 
right over his own subjects…But…if a tyrant…practises atrocities towards his 
subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of a human social connexion is not 
cut off in such case.”55   
 
The contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention is usually traced back to the 
19th century.56 International law did not then contain any general provision on the use 
of force, but, as noted by Rytter, “there was among states a sense of necessity to 
justify the use of force on moral or political grounds.” 57 Thus, in accordance with the 
“just war” theory, forcible interventions were considered lawful when carried out 
towards a government that “…violates the rights of humanity…”58, or as put by Sir H 
Lauterpacht, “in cases in which a State maltreats its subjects in a manner which 
shocks the conscience of mankind.”59  This doctrine gained broad recognition in 
legal theory. A substantial minority, however, rejected such a doctrine by referring to 
the principle of non-intervention.  
 
                                                 
54 Harhoff, F. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Inteventions – Armed Violence in the Name of 
Humanity?”, Nordic Journal of International Law 70:65-119 (2001), p. 80 
55 De Groot, De Jure Belli ac Pcis Libri Tres, Kelsey tranl., 1925, Chap. 25, quoted in Brenfors M. 
Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic Journal of International 
Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 463. 
56 Rytter, J.E.  “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001), p. 126, 
Brenfors M.,  Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic Journal 
of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 463, Harhoff, F. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Inteventions 
– Armed Violence in the Name of Humanity?”, Nordic Journal of International Law 70:65-119 (2001) 
p. 80 
57 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001), p. 126 
58 Arntz, M. in Rolin-Jacquemyns, quoted in Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian 
Intervention – A defence”, Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) 
, p. 463-464. 
59 Lauterpacht,  H.,“International law and Human rights”, Clarendon press, Oxford (1950), p. 32, 
quoted in Rytter, J.E., “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco 
to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 126.  
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Contemporary international legal writing do not agree upon the question whether 
state practice in the 19th and 20th century up to the UN Charter manifested a rule of 
international customary law.60  The instances of alleged humanitarian interventions 
virtually disappeared during these centuries, and when the doctrine was invoked, the 
genuine humanitarian motives were in most cases questionable.61 Humphrey has said 
that “partly because most if not all of them – i.e. humanitarian interventions in the 
19th century – were motivated by political considerations that had nothing to do with 
human rights, it is questionable whether so-called humanitarian intervention was ever 
recognized as an institution of the law of nations.”62 This development might also be 
related to the attempts in the international community to outlaw war as an instrument 
in international relations, notably through the Kellogg –Briand Pact, where states 
stated their conviction that "all changes in their relations" should be sought only by 
pacific means, condemned the resort to war for the "solution of international 
controversies", and renounced it as an instrument of national policy.63 The 
presumption now was no longer in favour of the alleged right to self-help and the 
right to resort to war.64 As Chesterman remarks, "humanitarian intervention appears 
to occupy a lacuna in the primitive international legal regime of the time."65 It is thus 
debatable whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was established under 
the customary law of that time. Far less controversial is the contention that the 
introduction of the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter art. 2 (4) 
outlawed whatever was left of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.66 
                                                 
60 Cassese, A. “The current legal regulation of the use of force”, Martinus Nijhoff Pulishers (1986) p. 
60 
61 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 128, 
Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 42 
62 Humphrey, J., in foreword p. 7 in Lillich, L. (ed.) “Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations” (Charlottesville: Universitypress of Virginia (1973) 
63 Treaty providing for the denounciation of Wars as an Instrument of National Policy, 27 Aug 1928, 
signed at Paris, in force 1929, 94 LNTS 57, preamble, referred in Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just 
Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 43 
64 Brownlie, I. “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen” in “Humanitarian intervention and the United 
Nations”, Lillich, R.  (ed.), University press of Virgina Charlottesville (1973) p. 142 
65 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 43-44 
66 Inter alia Brenfors M.,  Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, 
Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 464 and 498, Brownlie, I. “Thoughts on 
Kind-hearted Gunmen” in Lillich, R. (ed.), “Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations”, 
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1.4 Re-actualising Humanitarian intervention 
There are essentially three post- Second World War developments in international 
relations that have called for a new investigation of the doctrine of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. The first one concerns the nature of armed conflicts, 
which is increasingly changing from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. Former United 
Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali described this development as a 
“new breed” of civil war.67 The rise of internal conflicts is often connected to the 
thawing of the bipolar cold war, which has bread threats among peoples of long-
suppressed ethnic, religious and cultural differences.68 Buotros Buotros-Ghali 
commented on this development in a 1995 supplement to his Agenda for Peace: 
 
“The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet 
Union and elsewhere. As a result there has been a rash of wars within newly independent 
states, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and 
cruelty. The end of the cold war seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of such wars 
in Africa. In addition, many of the proxy wars fuelled by the cold war within states remain 
unresolved. Inter-state wars, by contrast, have become infrequent.”69  
 
As Blockmans notes, “most striking about these post-cold war crises has been the 
wanton disregard for basic human rights.”70 In this type of war civilians end up as the 
main direct or indirect target of armed operations.  It is estimated that civilian victims 
now constitute ninety per cent of casualties of armed conflicts.71 
                                                                                                                                          
Charlottesville: University press of Virgina (1973) p. 139, Dinstein, Y. “War, aggression and self-
defence”, Cambridge University Press (2001) (3rd.ed) p. 91 
67 Simons, P.C.  “Humanitarian Intervention: A Review of the Literature” p. 1, 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/Working%20PAPERS/wp012.html 
68 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999), United Nations Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali in supplement to Agenda for peace, UN GaOR, 50th Sess., UN Doc. 
A/50/60 (1995) 
69 Ibid. 
70 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p.760 
71 Simons, P.C  “Humanitarian Intervention: A Review of the Literature” p. 1, 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/Working%20PAPERS/wp012.html, see also Mary Kaldor in 
“New and old wars”: Organized violence in a global era (1999), referred in Zacklin, R.  “The United 
Nations and Humanitarian Intervention”, Virgina Journal of International law, Vol. 41:4 at 924 where 
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On occasions, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been invoked or 
subsequently served to legitimate interventions by the international community in 
these domestic conflicts. Such actions are justified when this is done pursuant to 
Security Council authorisation.72 
 
Questions of legality arise instead when the Security Council, due to the current 
political reality and decision-making procedure of the Council, fails to authorise the 
action necessary to prevent such disasters. In this situation, can individual states or a 
group of states carry out a unilateral humanitarian intervention on their own 
initiative like in the case of the interventions by India in Bangladesh in 1971, by 
Tanzania in Idi Uganda in 1979, by Vietnam in the Cambodia of Pol Pot 
(Kampuchea) in 1978 and by NATO in Kosovo in 1991, or must the prohibition on 
the use of force take precedence? 
 
The second evolving tenet relevant to our investigation is the dramatic changes in the 
international legal protection of human rights. The emergence of both universal and 
regional instruments has helped in crystallising legal norms guaranteeing human 
rights, which have had a significant effect on the status of individuals in international 
law, and in their position in relation to states. Obligations to respect the rights of the 
individuals now represent limits to the States’ supremacy in deciding how to treat 
their citizens. This development indicates a gradual shift in thinking about absolute 
notions of state sovereignty and its corollary principle of non-intervention, as laid 
down in art. 2 (7) of the Charter and has fed the arguments of those scholars who 
claim that the concept of sovereignty is being progressively eroded.73 It is held that 
this alleged erosion in the concept of sovereignty must have decisive consequences 
                                                                                                                                          
she points out that the ratio of military to civilian casualties at the beginning of the twentieth century 
was eight to one; by the 1990’s, the ratio had been almost exactly reversed. 
72 See section 1.2 
73 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 769, Reisman, M.,  
“Sovereignty and Human Rights In Contemporary International law”, AJILvol. 84 (1990) p. 866. 
Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic Journal of 
International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 459. See section 3.2.2. 
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for the interpretation of the rules protecting the sovereignty of states, notably the 
prohibition of force between states in the UN Charter art. 2 (4).74 This argument is a 
subject matter in the interpretation of art. 2 (4) in the light of subsequent 
development in international law, as we shall see section 4. 
 
Likely difficulties in reaching consensus upon a collective humanitarian intervention 
among the Members of the Security Council represent a third factor worth 
mentioning in this context. The current real-political situation has lead to what has 
been termed “the return to deadlock”75 in the Security Council. This refers to the 
situation during the cold war, in which the Security Council was crippled by the 
antagonisms between USA and USSR, and was thus unable to come to consensus 
between the five veto powers. After the end of the cold war and the collapse of the 
USSR, the Security Council experienced a short renaissance, most notably the 
Security Council measures taken following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The 
latest development however, with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo as the main 
incident, indicates a renewed deadlock of the Security Council.  
  
These developments pose a challenge to current international law in reconciling 
existing constraints on the use of armed force in cases where the Security Council 
fails to act, with the increasing desire and need to protect civilians and combatants 
from widespread and severe infringements of human rights that arise from internal 
conflicts due to civil war or to the persecution of groups by autocratic governments.76  
The quandary is whether the central juxtaposition of the prohibition of inter-state use 
of force poses a limit to this respect. 
 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 774 
76 Ibid. p. 761-762 
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1.5 The plan for the legal discussion 
The legal discussion falls in two parts. The first part analyses “unilateral 
humanitarian intervention” against an ordinary interpretation of art. 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter.77 The second part discusses whether subsequent developments in 
international relations render a re-interpretation or a modification of art. 2 (4). Three 
arguments are analysed under this section: First, how is art. 2 (4) to be interpreted in 
the light of developments in international law after 194578; second, can the 
ineffectiveness or inactivity of the Security Council weaken prohibition in art. 2 (4) 
out of force?79; three, has art. 2 (4) been modified by subsequent state practice?80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 See section 2 
78 See section 3 
79 See section 4 
80 See section 5.  
Unilateral humanitarian intervention and article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter          22 
   
2 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter 
2.1 The Charter regime on the use of force 
The Charter does not explicitly mention unilateral humanitarian intervention. Neither 
does it specifically prohibit it. The central rule on the use of force from which we 
must proceed is the prohibition of the use of force in art. 2(4), according to which  
 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 
 
The broad prohibition of the use of force in art 2(4) of the UN Charter was 
introduced to protect the sovereign equality of Member states as a means of waging 
war and ensuring peace.81  It is described as the “cardinal rule” of international law 
and “cornerstone” of peaceful relations among states82, and generally held not only to 
be treaty law and customary law but also jus cogens.83 The prohibition of inter-state 
use of force should be read in parallel with the principle of peaceful resolution of 
international disputes.84 The Charter allows for the use of force on only two explicit 
circumstances: as an act of self-defence85; or pursuant to an authorisation from the 
Security Council acting under Chapter 7. Cassese describes the Charter regime on the 
use of force well when he notes that “the Charter enforces a collective security 
system that hinges on a rule, collective action, and an exception, self defence.86 The 
subordinate status of self –defence to collective enforcement is seen in the last part of 
art. 51, after which, self-defence must yield to “necessary measures” taken by the 
Security Council.   
                                                 
81 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 222, Cassese, A. “The 
current legal regulation of the use of force”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1986) p. 4 
82 See eg. Dixon & McCorquodale, “Cases and materials in international law”, Blackstone press 
limited, 1991 (3rd.ed) p. 553 
83 See section supra section 1.2 and infra section 5.3.2 
84 Art. 2 (3) 
85 Art. 51 
86 Cassese A. “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?”, EJIL 10 (1999) 23-30, p. 24 
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Force carried out collectively under Chapter 7 is not the subject matter of this 
thesis.87 The only exception that explicitly allows for the unilateral use of force is 
thus art. 51on self-defence. Art. 51 reads: 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
 
This article embodies a right to use force for states that are victims of an “armed 
attack”.  Humanitarian intervention is per definition a) not a defensive use of force 
by one state in response to another state; and b) let alone, not in response to an 
“armed attack”. To the extent that there is an attack, that attack is occurring by a state 
against its own nationals, who themselves are not “member of the United Nations.”88 
Art. 51 can therefore not justify a unilateral humanitarian intervention.  
 
The question then remains whether unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
compatible with the prohibition of the threat or use of force in art. 2 (4). To answer 
this we must establish whether an interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force 
as proscribed in the provision’s text rules out the use of force to protect human 
rights.   
 
                                                 
87 see section 1.2 
88 Blockmans S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 770 
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2.2 Preliminary questions on the interpretation of article 2 (4) 
2.2.1 Defining the interpretative questions 
Art. 2 (4) has a complex structure and raises question of interpretation on nearly all 
terms. There is no agreement as to the exact scope of the provision. 
 
The most debated elements are probably the scope of the notion of “force” and the 
significance of the phrase “against the territorial integrity and political 
independence” which was added during the second drafting session of the 
International Law Commission. Unilateral humanitarian intervention is defined to 
involve the use of inter state armed force89 thus excluding any discussion of the 
notion of “force” in our context. 
 
The central question for our discourse is whether the prohibition is comprehensive or 
not. The relevant terms to be interpreted are the last 23 words of the article;  
 
“…against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”   
 
The question is whether this passage is to be interpreted as a qualification of the 
illegal force, i.e. that force is only illegal when it is directed against or in effect 
violates the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or if it in any 
other manner is inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Those who 
argue in favour of unilateral humanitarian intervention support this restrictive 
interpretation. Accordingly they claim that unilateral humanitarian intervention does 
not fall within the scope of the prohibition because it neither violates the “territorial 
integrity or political independence” of the target state, nor is it inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN Charter. Opponents to this line of argument, on the other hand, 
hold that art. 2 (4) is all-inclusive and therefore outlaws any use of force not 
                                                 
89 See definition in section 1.2 
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explicitly provided for in the Charter.  This is the interpretative question to be 
analysed below.  
 
2.2.2 The method of interpretation – treaty interpretation 
The disagreement between the proponents and the opponents of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention relates not only to the substantial question of whether art. 
2 (4) allows for the action, but also to the rules that govern the interpretative process. 
Disagreement of the latter is naturally determining for the outcome of the analysis of 
the substantive rules. The doctrinal approach must thus be commented.  
 
Basically, there are two contrasting interpretative approaches on the issue of 
humanitarian intervention. In Farer’s words, they can be described as the classical 
approach and the realist approach. The classical view presumes that the parties to a 
treaty “had an original intention which can be discovered primarily through textual 
analysis and which, in the absence of some unforeseen change in circumstances, 
must be respected until the agreement has expired according to its terms or been 
replaced by mutual consent.90 This is thus a “traditional” interpretative approach. In 
contrast, according to the realist approach, the “[t]exts themselves are but one among 
a large number of means of ascertaining original intention”. Moreover, to the realists, 
original intention has no intrinsic authority. “The past is relevant only to the extent 
that it helps us to identify currently prevailing attitudes about the property of a 
government’s acts and omissions.”91   
 
What matters is the interpretative approach that has the strongest foundations in 
international legal doctrine. This clearly suggests the classical approach. The 
                                                 
90 Farer, T.”An inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian intervention”, in L. Damrosch and D. 
Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International order (1991), p. 185, 186. 
91 Ibid.   
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International Court of Justice favours in general also this method.92 Fitzmaurice sums 
the court’s position in these words: 
 
“the intention of the framers of a treaty, as they emerged from the discussions or negotiations 
preceding its conclusion, must be presumed to have been expressed in the treaty itself, and 
are therefore to be sought for primarily in the actual text, and not in any extraneous 
source.”93  
 
This position is adopted in substance in the relevant provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties.94 ICJ practice95 and international legal 
doctrine supports the view that the Convention’s rules on treaty interpretation 
constitute a general expression of the principles of customary law relating to treaty 
interpretation.96 The interpretation of UN Charter art. 2 (4) must thus be determined 
according to the principles of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of the Treaties.97 
 
The “general rule” is enshrined in art 31 para. 1, which reads:  
 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
 
                                                 
92 Fitzmaurice, G.G.  “The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
interpretation and certain other points, British Yearbook of International Law, 28 (1951) p. 7 
93 Ibid p. 7 
94 see the “main rule” enshrined in art. 31 para.1 and discussion related to it below in section 2.2.2 and 
Brownlie, I.  “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) 5th edition p.  
632 
95 Namibia, ICJ reports  (1971), p. 47, Fisheries Jurisdiction, ICJ reports (1973), p. 18. 
96 Sinclair, I.  “The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties”, Manchester University Press (1984) 
p. 153. See also Brownlie, I.  “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) 
5th edition p. 630. The fact that strictly speaking, the Convention only applies to treaties concluded 
after the entry into force of the Convention (art. 4) and the fact that the treaty is not ratified by all 
members of the UN are therefore not relevant. 
97 Hereafter VCLT 
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The initial task is to interpret art 2(4) using this general rule. This rule combines 
three different methods of interpretation into one integrated rule.98 We must seek to 
find the ordinary meaning of the terms (literal interpretation) as they are to be 
understood in their context (contextual interpretation) and in the light of the objects 
and purposes of the UN Charter as a whole (teleological interpretation). The starting 
– point is thus the text itself, as a systematic whole.  
 
The contextual, or systematic, interpretation requires a reading of the article in the 
light of the whole treaty structure.99 Art. 31 para. 2 reads: 
 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
If the textual analysis leaves the meaning “ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or reasonable”, recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, hereunder preparatory works, is provided for in art 32. The 
preparatory works can also throw light on the teleological interpretation.100 
According to the predominant practice of the International Court of Justice, art. 32 
should be interpreted literally on this point; resort to preparatory work can only 
happen when the textual analysis fails to yield a clear result or leads to a 
unreasonable result.    
 
                                                 
98 Sevastvik, P. “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 249, n. 34 
99 Competence of the ILO, 1922, PCIJ, Series B, No.2 p. 33 
100 VCLT art 31 para.1 
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In addition to the context, art 2(4) must be examined in the light of any “subsequent 
agreement” or state practice that establishes such agreement, regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty,  and any other “relevant rules of international law.”101 It 
flows naturally from the contractual character of treaties and from the proposition 
that the parties to a treaty are legally entitled to modify a treaty, that they are entitled 
to interpret it in an authoritative way.102 Two elements of this provision need a 
comment: how can subsequent state practice and subsequent developments in 
international law be relevant in the interpretation of art. 2 (4)?  
 
I will deal with “relevant rules of international law” first. VCLT art. 31 proscribed in 
its original design the element of contemporaneity in the interpretation of treaties. 
The provisionally adopted text stated, inter alia, that the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of a treaty was to be determined “in the light of the general rules 
of international law in force at the time of its conclusion.”103 With these words, the 
provision was intended to reflect the general principle that “a judicial fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it and not of the law in force at 
the time when the dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”104 This element 
was not included straightforwardly in the final draft. Instead the element of “relevant 
rules of international law” is now extrinsic both to the text and “context” as defined 
in art. 31 para. 2. The wording thus seems to conflict with the above defined 
principle of contemporaneity. The question arises whether the UN Charter is to be 
interpreted in the light of the rules of international law in force at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty or those in force at the time of the interpretation.  
 
                                                 
101 VCLT art 31 
102 Sinclair, I. “The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties”, Manchester University Press (1984) 
p. 136 
103 Sinclair, I. “The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties”, Manchester University Press 
(1984)136, Sevastvik, P.  “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 250 
104 Island of Palmas arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards.  vol. 2 p. 845, ref. Sevastvik, P. “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny 
sedvanerätt och praxis”, Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 250, Sinclair, I. “The Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties”, Manchester University Press (1984) p. 139 
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The principle of contemporaneity as expressed by Judge Huber in the Island of 
Palmas arbitration105 was undisputed in the past.106 However, the ICJ has gradually, 
under the influence of the development of the law of the treaties, opened for an 
evolutionary interpretative approach, based on the nature of the provision or the 
treaty. As to the nature of the provision, Sinclair sums it up in these words:  
 
“…there is scope for the narrow and limited proposition that the evolution and development 
of the law can be taken into account in interpreting certain terms in a treaty which are by 
their very nature expressed in such general terms as to lend themselves to an evolutionary 
interpretation.”107  
 
Sinclair gives as examples of this category words like “domestic jurisdiction” and 
“public policy”.  
 
More importantly is the Court’s willingness to allow evolutionary elements in the 
interpretation of law-making treaties, and most notably, the UN Charter. The Court 
stated in the Namibia Advisory opinion that the “interpretation cannot remain 
unaffected by the subsequent development of law…Moreover, an international 
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”108  
 
The unique character and status of the UN Charter leaves it in a particular position. It 
was apparent already from the beginning that the element of evolution is inherent to 
the nature of the Charter as a dynamic treaty-regime.109 In view of the Charter’s 
                                                 
105 Island of Palmas arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. 2, p. 845 
106 See US Nationals in Marocco, ICJ Reports 1952 p. 189; South West Africa Case, ICJ Reports 1966 
p. 23, Sevastvik, P. “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 250, Simma, B. “The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary”, 
vol. 1, Oxford University Press (2nd. Ed) (2002) p. 24 
107 Sinclair, I. “The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties”, Manchester University Press (1984) 
p. 140 
108 Namibia Advisory opinion, ICJ Rep. (1971) p. 31 
109 Sevastvik, P. “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 288 
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character as a “World-constitution”110, with the overarching purpose of maintaining 
international security and peace, it would be absurd to see the Charter as a static 
instrument. Rather, an evolutionary approach seems appropriate so that subsequent 
developments in law and facts can be considered to achieve the original purposes. 
Accordingly, Edvard Hambro wrote in 1946: 
 
“The Charter, like every written constitution, will be a living instrument. It will be applied 
daily: and every application of the Charter, every use of an Article, implies interpretation: on 
each occasion a decision is involved which may change the existing law and start a new 
constitutional development. A constitutional customary law will grow up and the Charter 
itself will merely form the framework of the Organisation which will be filled in by the 
practice of the different organs.”111 
 
Confirming this prediction, the Court commented in the Nicaragua case that [t]he 
UN Charter…by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of force 
in international relations” and that international law has developed under the 
influence of the UN Charter to such an extent that “a number of rules contained in 
the Charter have acquired a status independent of it.”112  
 
In principle, all factors, including legal acts, declarations and other circumstances, 
must be taken into consideration in the evolutionary treaty interpretation, but it is 
uncertain as to which “phenomena, circumstances, and expressions are necessary to 
determine such an evolution.”113  Clearly, legal practice of the UN organs and State 
practice can be decisive elements. The relevance and impact in changing values is 
less certain.  
 
                                                 
110 The UN Charter art. 103 also formally puts the Charter in a lex-superior position. The article reads: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail. 
111 Pollux, The interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, 23 BYBIL, 1946, p. 54 
112 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 para 181 
113 Simma, B. “The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary”, vol. 1, Oxford University Press 
(2nd. Ed) (2002) p. 25 
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In any case, the interpretation is confined by the “radius” of the provision. Thus, if an 
interpretative result contradicts the underlying reasoning or purpose of the provision, 
it is no longer an interpretation, but a question of modification.114 Accordingly, 
custom serves as a supplementary function in the interpretation; it can fill gaps and 
help specifying ambiguous rules, but not contradict – exceed the interpretative scope 
of the article.115 Then it becomes a question of modification.  
 
The second factor of development that has to be considered is “subsequent [state] 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation.”116 Hence, state practice is a relevant factor to the 
interpretation of art. 2 (4).  This process, however, must be distinguished from 
practice that amounts to a modification of the provision. The latter concept is 
discussed in detail in section 5.2. In the present context, only the major distinctions 
have to be drawn.  
 
As noted by the International Law Commission in the drafting process of the VCLT, 
the distinction between treaty interpretation based on subsequent practice and treaty 
modification based on subsequent practice is often blurred, but legally the processes 
are distinct.117  A guide-line seems to be that if the interpretation is clearly at 
variance with the text, it is no longer an interpretation, but modification. 118 Zacklin 
describes the distinction as a question of whether the subsequent practice develops 
sub lege or contra legem.119 Sevastvik clarifies the issue in these words: 
                                                 
114 Kontou, N. “The Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary 
International Law”, Oxford (1994) p. 19, Sevastvik, P.  “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd 
av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 251 
115 Sevastvik, P.  “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 253 
116 VCLT art. 31 nr. 3 emphasis added 
117 [1966] 2 YILC p. 236 
118 Wolfke, K. “Treaties and custom: Aspects of interrelation in Essays on the law of the treaties”, Jan 
Klabbers and Rene Lefeber (eds), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1998), Sevastvik, P. “Informell 
modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, Nordstedts Juridik (2002) in note 68, 
p. 303 
119 See Sevastvik, P. “Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, 
Nordstedts Juridik (2002) p. 296 
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“If the subsequent practice develops sub lege i.e. within the interpretative radius of the treaty 
provision (or treaty) it is a question of interpretation of the provision in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in article 31 (3) b of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If 
the subsequent practice develops contra legem and falls outside of the interpretative radius of 
the provision (or treaty) the provision is modified. The modification procedure is described 
as a de facto modification. A de facto modification of a provision has the same legal status as 
a formally undertaken amendment provided for in a treaty.”120 
 
2.2.3 Conclusion  
This account serves as the background against which art 2 (4) must be interpreted. 
The Charter can be seen as a hybrid between a multilateral treaty and a multilateral 
treaty with constitutional elements. 121 In addition to the rules laid down in the 
VCLT, the principles of dynamic /evolutionary interpretation as outlined above, must 
apply. The question now is what legal consequences that can be drawn from an 
analysis of art. 2(4) conducted with the help of the interpretative principles we have 
highlighted. 
 
2.3 Unilateral humanitarian intervention as compatible with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms in article 2(4) read in their context and in the light 
of the objects and purposes of the UN Charter. 
2.3.1 A reminder 
It is appropriate here to repeat the principal interpretative question: Does art 2 (4) 
prohibit the threat or use of force in general or only when directed against the 
“territorial integrity or political independence” of a state “or in any other manner 
inconsistent” with the UN Charter? 
 
                                                 
120 Ibid. p. 384 
121 Ibid. p. 292 
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2.3.2 Literal interpretation  
2.3.2.1 “ territorial integrity and political independence” 
The expression “against the territorial integrity or political independence” appears on 
its face to limit the prohibition of force.  It defines in negative terms the targets 
against which the threat or use of force is illegal. Thus, Schachter observes that “if 
these words are not redundant, they must qualify the all-inclusive prohibition against 
force”.122  Reading the passage together with the article’s last words confirms this 
understanding, that is, the wording “or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Charter.”123 If the first passage were intended to indicate an all-
embracing prohibition on the use of force, the addition in fine would seem to serve 
no purpose.  
 
This interpretation finds support also in the interpretative principle inclusion unius 
est exclusio alterius124, which suggests the idea that the inclusion of the phrase in art. 
2 (4) does restrict the prohibition by banning only the type of force that would violate 
the territorial integrity or political independence of states. 
 
If the drafters wanted to create a blanket-provision, they would have done so. 
Nothing in the text allows a reading that excludes the qualifications. A literal 
interpretation thus suggests that the phrase “territorial integrity and political 
independence” should be read to limit the prohibition to uses of force that are above 
a threshold where the territorial integrity or political independence of a state is 
attacked125: force directed against other targets falls outside the limits of the 
prohibition. According to this narrow textual understanding, a unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is only a violation of art 2 (4) if it is considered to be an 
                                                 
122 Schachter, O. “The Right of States to Use force”, (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review p. 1620, p.1625 
123 Art 2(4) in fine, emphasis added 
124 The inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other 
125 Murphy, S.D,  “Humanitarian intervention – The United Nations in an Evolving World Order” 
(1996) p. 71 
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application of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”  
 
The next task is to determine what is an infringement of the “territorial integrity and 
political independence” of the target state.  
 
The wording in art 2 (4) does not give any indications as to what is below or above 
this threshold. Proponents and opponents of a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention argue respectively for a restrictive and broad understanding of the terms. 
 
One reading is that only force that alters or abolishes the political independence or 
the territorial integrity is an infringement of the article. According to this view, 
coercive action with only short-term effect would fall outside the scope of the 
qualification and be legal as long as the end sought by the use of force is consistent 
with the purposes of the Charter, cf. art. 2 (4) in fine. Accordingly, they argue that 
humanitarian intervention would be legal because it is a short-term action that does 
not seek to deprive the target state of its territory or its political independence, but 
only aims at protecting human rights.  This is the statement submitted by Anthony 
D’Amato as a justification for the legality of the American invasion of Panama in 
1989: “the United States did not intend to, and has not colonized, annexed or 
incorporated Panama. Before and after the intervention, Panama was and remains an 
independent nation.”126 Fernandò Tesòn similarly argues that “[a] genuine 
humanitarian intervention does not result in territorial conquest or political 
subjugation”, and does therefore not violate the territorial integrity of political 
independence of the state.127 
 
In contrast, for those who favour the broad view,  “territorial integrity and political 
independence” merely stand for territorial “inviolability”, so that any non-consensual 
                                                 
126  D’amato, A. “The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny” (1990), 84 AJIL, p. 
520 
127 Tesón, F.  “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p.151 
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use of force that is directed against a state’s territory or that aims at forcing a state to 
take a decision it would not otherwise take, is a violation of art. 2 (4), even if the 
violation is merely temporary.128 The provision is thus violated the moment the 
political will or the territorial integrity of the target state is forcibly coerced. A 
humanitarian intervention, then, however limited, constitutes a temporary violation 
of the target State’s political independence and territorial integrity because it is 
carried out against that State’s wishes. Schachter similarly argues that a humanitarian 
intervention runs counter to the prohibition because it suppresses the political will of 
the government in the target state and because it represents a violation of its 
territorial rights.129 
 
The wording of art.2 (4) itself does not clarify this controversy. Legal clarity and 
predictability, however, suggest that the legal use of force is not subject to discretion 
and thus supports the broad (“inviolability”) view; if not, “a legion of loopholes will 
inevitably be left open”, which could give rise to unwanted abuse of force.130 
However, both readings are compatible with the wording of art. 2 (4) thus yielding a 
textual analysis insufficient to provide any clear answer to the question of the legality 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
 
2.3.2.2 “or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter” 
This passage also has been subject to controversial readings. The most radical 
argument put forward is that the addition of this phrase makes even the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state legal as long 
as the motives are not inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. This view is not 
supported prima facie by the text. The expression,  “or” in any “other” suggests an 
                                                 
128 Schachter, O.  “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1991)p. 
113, Helgesen, V.  ”Kosovo og folkeretten”, Institutt for forsvarsstudier, Info 4/99p. 25, Brownlie, I. 
“International Law and the Use of Force Between States”, Oxford at the Clarendon press (1963) p. 
267-8 
129 Schachter, O. “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1991) 
p.118 
130  Dinstein, Y. “War, aggression and self-defence”, Cambridge University Press (2001) (3rd.ed) p. 82 
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inclusive meaning.131 As Schachter points out, it is “strange, if not absurd” and “very 
definitely invalid” to argue that the added reason for the illegality of force (namely, 
inconsistency with a Charter purpose) results in an exception to the general 
prohibition of force against political independence and territorial integrity.  Indeed, 
as argued by Dinstein, these words in fine “ form the centre of gravity of art. 2(4) 
because they create a residual “catch all” provision that closes up the gaps not 
covered by the first part. 132 Then, the two passages read together, clearly indicates 
that also force against the “territorial integrity or political independence” is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. The assumption is accordingly that 
“territorial integrity and political independence” was added only to emphasis the 
gravest violation of the purposes of the Charter.133 
 
Summing up, the correct reading should be that the article establishes two categories 
of illegal force; the first one, force directed “against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state”; and the second, force inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Charter, the latter including the first: force that does not infringe the 
territorial integrity or the political independence is nevertheless illegal if inconsistent 
with the purposes of the Charter.  
 
Presuming here that humanitarian intervention is not infringing the territorial 
integrity or political independence of the target state, the question remains whether 
the action is “inconsistent” with the purposes of the Charter: is the use of force 
directed at protecting human rights consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter? 
Teson argues that this clause “at first blush…provides a rather strong literal 
argument in favor of accepting a right of humanitarian intervention in appropriate 
cases. It need hardly be emphasized that the promotion of human rights is a main 
                                                 
131  Chesterman, S.  “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 52 
132 Dinstein, Y. “War, aggression and self-defence”, Cambridge University Press (2001) (3rd.ed) p. 82 
133 A similar argument put forward by Dinstein Y.  “War, aggression and self-defence”, Cambridge 
University Press (2001) (3rd.ed) p. 83 
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purpose of the United Nations.”134  However, the analysis cannot end here. The term, 
“inconsistent” requires a holistic evaluation that presupposes a distinct hierarchy of 
purposes in the Charter as originally conceived.  It is therefore not sufficient that the 
promotion of human rights is one of the important purposes of the Charter if this 
would challenge the protection of other purposes carrying greater status.  
 
Most scholars argue that peace, in the sense of the absence of inter state conflicts, is 
privileged over the protection of human rights in the text of the Charter: the primary 
purpose of the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security 
between states and not the protection of justice and human rights within states.135  
Art. 1 para. 1 lists the first and paramount purpose of the UN: 
 
“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;” 
 
Art. 1 (2) furthermore speaks of the strengthening of peace through the development 
of friendly relations. 
 
The term “International peace and security” is traditionally narrowly limited to inter-
state relations.  Nothing in the preparatory works suggests that the parties envisioned 
a government’s treatment of its own nationals as a situation to be considered as a 
                                                 
134 Tesón, F.  “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 151 
135 Schachter, O.  “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1991) p. 
118, Simon C.  “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 92, Simma, B. “The 
Charter of the United Nations – a commentary”, vol. 1, Oxford University Press (2nd. Ed) (2002) p. 
40, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge London and New 
York (1997) p. 220 
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threat to or a breach of peace.136  The internal relations within state were furthermore 
to be considered solely a domestic concern, according to art. 2 (7).   
 
Indeed, any unilateral use of force would be inconsistent with the Charter’s principal 
emphasis on the purpose of maintaining peace.  
 
There is, however, no doubt that the Charter affirms the importance of human rights. 
The Preambular paragraph 1 declares “…faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women…”. 
Art. 1 moreover states the purposes of “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to sex, language 
or religion” and the development of “friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”. Human 
rights provisions are also found in arts. 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76. 
 
But nothing in the Charter’s text indicates that resort to force is a legitimate means to 
protect them. On the contrary, art. 1 speaks of the purpose of co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all.  Arts. 55 and 56 provide this purpose with some substance, but the 
advancement of human rights is also here restricted to co-operation and promotion. 
The means to achieve this purpose is furthermore connected to the conditions for 
realizing peaceful relations among nations, the most central purpose of the Charter. 
Art. 55 reads: 
 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations 137 based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:  
                                                 
136 Farer, T.  “An inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian intervention” , in “Law and force in the 
new international order”, Damrosch and Scheffer (eds), Westview press (1991), p. 190. However, see 
discussion later about the post 1945 development in this concept 
137 emphasis added 
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a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development;  
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational cooperation; and  
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Art. 56 encourages member states to “pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in co-operation” for the promotion of the human rights purposes set out in art. 
55. 138 
 
In fact, the logic of the Charter itself suggests that further questions of human rights 
were postponed or left aside to be taken up by a separate body in more detail. Under 
Chapter 4, the General Assembly “shall initiate studies and make recommendations 
for the purpose of…(b)…assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”139 The 
Charter furthermore leaves ECOSOC with the responsibility for the future 
development in human rights and empowers this body to make recommendations in 
this realm. ECOSOC is also called upon to establish a commission for the promotion 
of human rights.140 It is therefore logic that no enforcement procedures were laid 
down in the Charter.  
  
The letter of the Charter thus gives the objective of human rights protection a lower 
position to that of promoting peace. This is also the common view among legal 
scholars.141 Unilateral non-consensual use of force to ensure justice within a state is 
certainly not consistent with the purposes of the Charter. 
                                                 
138 emphasis added 
139 UN Charter art. 13 (1) 
140 UN Charter art. 62 and 68 
141 Cassese A. “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?”, EJIL 10 (1999) 23-30, p. 23, Murphy, 
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2.3.2.3 Conclusion on literal interpretation 
The literal analysis suggest that art 2 (4) does not prohibit unilateral use of force in 
general, but only uses of force against “the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” and uses of force that  “in any other manner” is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. Whether a unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is an illegal infringement of the first category could not be determined 
by a textual analysis alone. However, a unilateral humanitarian intervention anyway 
violates the prohibition because it is inconsistent with the UN Charter’s paramount 
purpose of maintaining peace and thus infringes the “catch-all” provision laid down 
in the article in fine.  
 
2.3.3 Contextual and teleological interpretation 
2.3.3.1 Introduction 
The wording of art. 2 (4) analysed against the Charter system as a whole and its 
objects and purposes confirms the contention that a unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is incompatible with the prohibition of the use of force. The teleological 
and systematic interpretation suggest that the phrase  “against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state” should not be interpreted restrictively, but 
rather to make the prohibition on the use of force water-tight. Key-words here are the 
Charter’s normative logic, the allocation of coercive jurisdiction, and its 
omissions.142 
2.3.3.2 Interpretation 
Art. 2 (4) must first of all be read in conjunction with the purposes enshrined in art. 1 
(1) of the Charter and the mechanisms established to achieve these ends.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
S.D,  Humanitarian intervention – The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996) p. 130, 
Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) pp. 53, 70  
 
142 Farer, T. in Damrosch Scheffer, “Law and Force in the New International Order”, Westview Press 
(1991) pp. 185, 190 
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It has been recognized in section 2.3.2.2. how, given the hierarchy of purposes set 
out in the Charter, maintenance of peace has been assigned a higher priority than 
protection of human rights.  Surely, the respect of human rights is established as a 
legal obligation143, but the Charter does not allow for the enforcement of this 
obligation to be obtained at the cost of destabilizing peace.  A reading of the phrase 
“against the territorial integrity and political independence” which results in a 
restrictive view of the prohibition of the use of force thus runs against the purposes 
of the Charter.  
 
This position is confirmed by the principle and standard of conduct laid down in the 
preceding art 2 (3): 
 
All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
 
The status of the purpose of peace as a paramount principle is also reflected in the 
regime on the use of force established in the Charter.  Its overall architecture and the 
way it allocates coercive jurisdiction, provide three arguments in support of viewing 
art 2 (4) as a comprehensive prohibition of the use of force.  
 
First: the Charter sets out both the purpose of promoting human rights and the 
purpose of promoting peace. However, while a standard of conduct is set out in order 
to achieve the purpose of promoting peace in art. 2 (3) and art. 2 (4), no such 
principle is established to promote human rights, but for art. 55 and 56 mentioned 
before.  Furthermore, there are two exceptions to the broad prohibition of the use of 
force, none of which explicitly refers to unilateral humanitarian intervention or says 
anything about the use of force to protect human rights. 
  
                                                 
143 Namibia, ICJ Rep. (1971) pp. 16, 57 
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Second: the Charter provides explicitly only for one discretionary exception that 
allows the use of force. This, however, is the system of collective action pursuant a 
Security Council mandate under Chapter 7 and safeguarded by decision-making 
procedures that ensure a broad support in the world-community. The decision-
making competence is thus allocated in a Community body, which guarantees that 
when an action of force is authorised, it is assumed to find support in the “common 
interest”, as set out in the preamble.144 In other words, the Charter rests upon the 
notion that policy-making in matter of use of force should be centralised and not left 
to the discretion of individual states. Instead of which, these would have to settle 
their disputes by peaceful means. The use of force under this mandate is furthermore 
related to an existing threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression, thus 
related to maintenance of the primary purpose of international peace. 
 
Third: the only explicit exception to the prohibition of the use of force that allows for 
unilateral action is the right to self-defence enshrined in art. 51 of the Charter. The 
omission of explicit reference to humanitarian intervention must be assumed 
intentional.145 We have also made it clear that this article cannot serve as a legal 
ground for humanitarian intervention.146 
 
The absence of a rule permitting unilateral military measures to enforce the respect 
of human rights is also coherent with the enforcement mechanisms established in the 
various human rights treaties that have come into being subsequently to the adoption 
of the UN Charter. None of these contains provisions that allow for international 
enforcement with military means.147 On the contrary, they contain advisory, judicial 
or semi-judicial procedures of various kinds that are far more intrusive on the 
defendant’s sovereignty than the obligations under UN Charter under art. 55 and 56, 
                                                 
144 UN Charter preambular paragraph 7 
145 See Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 469 
146 Supra section 2.1. Note also that even here there is an obligation of immediately reporting to the 
Security Council which should then endorse further action, cf. art. 51 
147  Helgesen, V. ”Kosovo og folkeretten”, Institutt for forsvarsstudier, Info 4/99 p. 26 
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which demand the Member States nothing more than to “pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in co-operation …” for the promotion of human rights.  As 
the Court stated in Nicaragua, where human rights are protected by international 
conventions, that protection takes the form provided for in those conventions.148  
 
2.3.3.3 Conclusion 
To read into art 2(4) that individual states or a group of states unilaterally may seize 
to armed force to protect human rights is not coherent with the Charter’s regime on 
the use of force. The normative logic of the Charter clearly suggests that the only 
situations in which the use of force was supposed to be authorised, were in self-
defence or pursuant to Chapter 7. If Member States had wanted so, they could have 
established coercive authority in connection with all the principles and purposes of 
the Charter, inclusive of the protection of human rights. As a preliminary conclusion 
we thus agree with Farer when he holds that “if one deems the original intention of 
the founding states to be controlling with respect to the legitimate occasions for the 
use of force, then humanitarian intervention is illegal.”149 
 
2.4 The Travaux Préparatoires 
 
Resort to preparatory works, as a “subsidiary means” of interpretation, serves in 
general to throw light on ambiguities in the text.150 However, based on the clear 
arguments against unilateral humanitarian intervention, both deriving from the 
textual analysis and the contextual interpretation151, it is difficult to see how the 
preparatory works can make a difference in the interpretative discourse.  
 
                                                 
148 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para. 267 
149  Farer, T. in Damrosch Scheffer, “Law and Force in the New International Order”, Westview Press 
(1991) p. 191 
150 See supra section 2.2.2. 
151 Ibid. 
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The majority of writers hold that the preparatory works of the UN Charter confirm 
the view that unilateral humanitarian intervention is incompatible with art. 2 (4) of 
the Charter.152 As in the textual analysis, the question is whether the phrases 
“territorial integrity or political independence” or “in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations” were meant to limit the prohibition of the use 
of force.   
 
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to art. 2 (4) read: 
 
All Members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force in a way inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.153 
 
No reference was made to the “territorial integrity and political independence” of any 
state. This supports the textual conclusion above; all actions inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN are incompatible with art. 2 (4). This obviously includes actions 
against “territorial integrity or political independence” as the core of state 
sovereignty, which the prohibition was set out to protect in order to wage inter-state 
force.154  
 
The reason why the phrase was included in the final draft is also clear from the 
preparatory works. A number of states, notably smaller ones, put forward the 
necessity to emphasise the protection of territorial sovereignty and political 
independence as the main means to achieve the purpose of international peace. An 
Australian amendment inserting the phrase “territorial integrity and political 
independence” was adopted at the San Francisco Conference in response to this 
desire. During the San Francisco Conference, delegates from Brazil and Norway 
raised the possibility of the passage being interpreted restrictively as opposed to the 
                                                 
152 Inter alia Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 49, 
Brownlie, I. “International Law and the Use of Force Between States”, Oxford at the Clarendon press 
(1963) p. 267 
153 Referred in Brownlie, I. “International Law and the Use of Force Between States”, Oxford at the 
Clarendon press (1963) p. 266  
154 see supra section 2 
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extensive prohibition from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Norway suggested that 
the phrase should be omitted in order to make clear that the article “did not 
contemplate any use of force, outside of action by the Organization, going beyond 
individual or collective self-defence.”155 The majority of states however, did not 
consider the wording inadequate and the US delegate emphasised 
 
“that the intention of the authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an 
absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the phrase “or in any any other manner” was designed to 
insure that there should be no loopholes.”156  
 
The Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I subsequently emphasised that  
 
“unilateral use of force or any other coercive measures of that kind is neither authorized nor 
admitted.”157  
 
There is no indication in the records that the phrase was intended to have a restrictive 
effect.158  
 
Some scholars still claim that the preparatory works are not clear. Teson holds out 
the fact that the Norwegian suggestion to omit the qualifying clause was not adopted 
and the fact that there is no indication in the preparatory works that the drafters 
expressly contemplated and rejected the hypothesis of armed intervention for 
humanitarian purposes.159 The account in the paragraphs above clearly contradicts 
the first argument. And, since the preparatory works clearly disclose that the 
                                                 
155 Statement from the Norwegian delegate referred in Brownlie, I. “International Law and the Use of 
Force Between States”, Oxford at the Clarendon press (1963) p. 267 
156 See Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 49, Sevastvik, P. 
“Informell modifikation av traktater till följd av ny sedvanerätt och praxis”, Nordstedts Juridik (2002) 
p. 341 
157 See Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 49 
158 Brownlie, I. “International law and the use of force by states”, Oxford:Clarendon Press (1963) p. 
267 
159 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 154 
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intention was to write a comprehensive prohibition, absence of rejections of a 
doctrine permitting the use of force is not surprising.  
 
The preparatory works thus warrant the conclusion that the phrase “territorial 
integrity and political independence” was not meant to have a qualifying effect and 
amplifies the textual conclusion above.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
Unilateral humanitarian intervention is not compatible with art. 2 (4) read in the light 
of its context and the purposes of the UN Charter. 
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3 Article 2 (4) in the light of subsequent developments in international law  
3.1 Introduction 
This section undertakes an evolutionary interpretation of art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  
Some scholars have put forward that art 2 (4) read in the light of the shifting 
foundations of international law does not outlaw the use of force to protect human 
rights.  It has been argued that the restraints of the Charter on the use of force, resting 
upon the desire to protect the sovereignty of the state, have been superseded by a 
new consensus concerning the use of force to protect human rights and that a 
humanitarian intervention must be lawful insofar as it purports these values.160 
Theoretically, this argument would have to prove that a) current international law 
sets the protection of human rights ahead of the protection of the sovereignty of the 
state and that b) this must lead to a re-interpretation of art. 2 (4) of the Charter. This 
is the thesis discussed in the following sections.     
 
3.2 Sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The sovereign equality of states is the key legitimating feature and basic norm of the 
international legal system.161  It was fundamental to the development of the modern 
system of states as laid down in the Westphalia-treaty in 1648. As the ICJ put it in 
the Nicaragua case, it is the principle “on which the whole of international law 
rests.”162 Then, in the words of Bennoune, there would be no international law 
without the nation-state and no nation-state would have developed and prevailed but 
 
                                                 
160 Inter alia Brenfors M.,  Petersen M.  “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, 
Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 471 
161 Brownlie, I. “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) 5th edition p. 
289, Wheeler, N.J “Saving Strangers”, Oxford University Press (2002) p. 46, Abiew, F. “The 
evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention, Kluwer law international (1999) p. 
23.  
162 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para 263 
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for the idea of sovereignty.”163 
 
“Sovereignty” is traditionally held to connote supreme authority of the state within 
its territorial borders and over citizens abroad164, and the equality of status between 
states. The principle was enshrined explicitly in the UN Charter  art. 2(1), which 
reads: 
 
The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. 
 
The Drafters of the UN Charter considered the independence of states, especially 
with respect to matters of domestic concern, of foremost importance.165  Art. 2 (7) 
therefore prohibits the UN from interfering within the internal matters of a state. The 
protection of the sovereignty of the state was furthermore seen as a means of 
ensuring peace, that is, the absence of armed conflicts between states. Accordingly, 
art. 2 (4) outlaws any unilateral use of force against the sovereignty of another state. 
The protection of human rights was given a subordinate status to these values.166  
 
Through history the notion of “sovereignty” has been given multiple meanings and its content has 
never been generally agreed upon.167  Critics of the concept have put forward that it might as well be 
eliminated from the constitutive characteristics in the legal system. Oppenheim put it this way in 
1905: “The term is used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority.”168 
                                                 
163 Bennoune, K.  “Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Re-examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through 
the Lens of Iraq”, EJIL 13 (2002) p. 243-262 p. 244. According to the ICJ Statute art. 38 (1) (c), 
sovereignty, as a principle of international law, it is also a source of international law. 
164 Island of Palmas case,  Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards. Vol. 2, p. 839, Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A 
defence”, Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 459, Abiew, F.K.  “ The 
Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention”, Kluwer Law International 
(1999) p. 25 
165 Charney, J., “Commentary: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo”, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational law, Vol. 32, Nov. 1999, no. 5, p 1240 
166 See supra section 2.3.2.2., Murphy, S.D., “Humanitarian intervention – The United Nations in an 
Evolving World Order” (1996) p. 70 and Farer, T.J., ”An inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian 
intervention”, in L. Damrosch and D. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International order 
(1991) p. 190 
167 Abiew, F. “The evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention”, Kluwer law 
international (1999) p. 30.  
168 Oppenheim, “International law”, vol. 1, Longmans & Co. (1905) p. 108.  
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More recently, Louis Henkin argues that “Sovereignty, strictly, is the locus of ultimate legitimate 
authority in a political society, once the prince or “the crown”, later the parliament or the people. It is 
an internal concept and does not have, need not have, any implications for relations between one state 
or another”, and suggested to avoid the term.169 Likewise Akehurst purports that sovereignty hardly 
denotes anything else than the independence of states and suggests to substitute the term with 
“independence”. This debate on the principle itself will not be furthered here. However, the arbitrator 
Max Huber’s holding in the Island of Palmas case (1928) that “the concept of sovereignty remains of 
necessity the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international relations”170, 
might not be as accurate today as it was 70 years ago.  
 
There is no doubt that the notion of sovereignty by nature is a term that, according to 
the theories of evolutionary interpretative approach described above in section 2.2.2, 
is shaped by the changing foundations of its context, i.e. the developments in 
international law and international relations. It cannot be seen as “a crystal, 
transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in 
colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used.”171 As the Permanent Court of International Justice put it in 1923 in its 
advisory opinion the Nationality Decrees case in relation to the League of Nations’ 
predecessor to UN art. 2(7), “the question whether a certain matter is or is not solely 
within the jurisdiction of a state is essentially a relative question; it depends on the 
development of international relations…”172 
 
                                                 
169 Henkin, L., “International law: Politics and values (1995) p.. 9-10, quoted in Kingsbury, B.  
“Sovereignty and inequality, EJIL 9 (1998), 599-625. 
170 Island of Palmas case, (1928), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards. Vol. 2,p. 829 and p. 839 
171 Judge Holmes’s dictum in Towner vs. Eisner, 245 U.S. 372, 376 (1918), quoted in “Sovereignty 
and Human rights in contemporary international law”, Reisman, M.  AJIL, vol. 84, 1990 p. 867 ff. 
The statement does not relate to the concept of sovereignty but the nature of any legal term. See also 
Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic Journal of 
International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 460, note 54. “Sovereignty is not a unit, which a state either 
has or does not have; it is a relative norm”, Openheim, International law (5th ed. By Lauterpacht, 
1935) p. 117. See also the South West Africa opinion where the International court noted on the 
absurdity of mechanically applying an old norm without reference to fundamental constitutive 
changes 
172 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco (1923) PCIJ, Series B no. 4, p. 24 
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It is also a fact that the traditional concept of state sovereignty is loosing ground in 
many areas of international law. The UN Secretary General said in 1999 that  
 
“[s]tate sovereignty, which for all of the twentieth century had been regarded as the very 
foundation of organized international society as enshrined in the UN Charter, was being 
redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation, that “[t]he state is now 
widely understood to be servant of its people, and not vice versa.”173 
 
3.2.2 Erosion of sovereignty – growth of human rights 
Subsequent development in the international community has penetrated the 
traditional supremacy of the sovereign in a myriad of ways, 174 and international law 
increasingly values and protects the rights of the people and individuals on account  
of the sovereignty of the state.  
 
The conception of the states’ political legitimacy as deriving from popular support, 
also called popular sovereignty, won positive ground through the French and 
American Revolution. As Reisman puts it, “With the words ‘We the people’, the 
American Revolution inaugurated the concept of the popular will as the theoretical 
and operational source of political authority.”175 According to Peaslee, 85% of the 
nations (by 1965) have by their constitution established the people as the sovereign 
                                                 
173 UN Secretary General in “Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, U.N. 
GAOR, 54th Sess, 4th plan. Mtg., , UN Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999) at 1-2: (1) ref. Zacklin, R. “The United 
Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, Virgina Journal of International Law, Vol. 41:4 (2001) p. 923 
at 928. 
174 Similarly Rosenau says: “For the first time since the period that culminated in the settlement of the 
Westphalia in 1648, turbulence has overwhelmed world politics and altered its parameters so 
extensively that the underpinnings of a new world order have been laid (…) All the indicators suggest 
that the legal status of sovereignty rights is bound to be subverted by the transformative dynamics 
currently at work in international politics”, Rosenau, Sovereignty in a turbulent world, 1995, p. 203, 
221. Also, as a result of globalisation, notably the liberalization of markets, the walls of sovereignty 
are no protection against movements of capital, labour, information and ideas.  “Free markets” now 
prevail in the vast part of the world and global and regional arrangements with supranational elements 
challenge the normative priority of the state, note e.g. the institutional structure of the European 
Union.  
175 Reisman, M.  “Sovereignty and Human rights in contemporary international law” AJIL, vol. 84, 
1990 p. 867 
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source of power.176 The formal international legal system has codified the principle 
in art. 1 of the UN Charter, which reads, inter alia, that international relations should 
be “based on the respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples.” Subsequently it was expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, now accepted as expression of customary international law177, in art. 21 (3), 
which reads, inter alia, “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government…”   
 
Traditional sovereignty has also lost ground due to the philosophy of human rights. 
The emergence of international human rights law since the enactment of the Charter 
indicates an increasing interest in the international community for the promotion of 
justice in international relations and international law.178 In Reisman’s words, the 
human rights program has shifted “the fulcrum of the international legal system from 
the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people.”179  In the aftermath of the 
holocaust and the atrocities of The Second World War, human rights have been 
established as a matter of international concern. The Preamble of the UN Charter 
declared, inter alia, that the world community  “reaffirm(ing) faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
man and woman…” The network of constitutive rules and institutions, both at the 
universal and regional level, that have come into being in order to protect human 
rights since the enactment of the charter represents, in Abiew’s words a “theoretical 
shift in the conception of human rights”180 and an erosion in the states sovereignty. 
And it is indeed from this extraordinary development in the protection of human 
rights that all those who support unilateral humanitarian intervention draw their 
                                                 
176 Whiteman, M.M. “Digest of International Law”, Vol.1, Department of State Publication (1963). p. 
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arguments. Thus, Teson argues that “ anyone who in the face of the impressive rise 
of human rights concerns simply asserts that post-1945 international law must be 
seen as one containing a rigid prohibition of war, even to remedy serious human 
rights deprivations, carries a considerable burden of proof. One simply cannot select 
article 2 (4) as the only norm that had a revolutionary impact on international 
law.”181 
 
The sovereignty of the state is eroded because norms that protect human rights 
impose duties on the state vis-à-vis the nationals. The arbitrator in the Island of 
Palmas Case stressed this duty as early as 1928182, and the UN General Assembly 
reaffirmed in 1970 that sovereignty includes for each state “a duty to comply fully 
and in good faith with its international obligations.”183  The negative denotation of 
this duty was expressed by the ICJ in relation to human rights and the UN Charter in 
the Namibia opinion in 1971 in these words: “to establish…and to enforce 
distinctions…restrictions…which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is 
a flagrant violation of the purpose and principles of the Charter.”184 State-actions 
contrary to human rights obligations are violations of international law and infer 
upon the states an international responsibility.185 This could lead to claims against the 
perpetrating state under some regional arrangements established in human rights 
conventions, such as the European Court of Human Rights.186  
 
The introduction of the concept of erga omnes obligations in the dictum of the 
Barcelona Traction Case,187 and the customary doctrine on jus cogens human rights 
                                                 
181 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 157 
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Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83 art. 1 
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that is developing in the aftermath of this judgement and the work of the 
International Law Commission188, mark another important step in strengthening the 
status and universal protection of human rights. The same does the establishment of 
the tribunals of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and most importantly the newly 
entered into force International Criminal Court, which show that sovereignty is not 
any longer an absolute legal shield for the individuals acting on the behalf of the 
state. 
 
The protection of human rights has become an issue of universal concern also 
through the practice of the Security Council. Art. 39, as one of the main provisions of 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, was meant to be a collective rule of safeguard against 
acts of aggressions and other threatening international conflicts, and art 2(7) were to 
prevent interventions in internal matters of States. Art. 39 reads:  
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 
 
However, the Security Council has expressed that  “the absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. 
The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”189 The Council has 
furthermore moved towards classifying national human rights violations as threats to 
the international peace and security190, and the Council and other international bodies 
are increasingly intervening in internal conflicts where human rights are in serious 
                                                 
188 See section 1.2 and Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 
773 
189 The President of the Security Council, SC doc., S/23500, p. 3.  
190 See Brenfors M. , Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defense”, Nordic 
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jeopardy.191  A precedent which confirms this is Security Council Resolution 688192 
issued in relation to the situation of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The 
Security Council stated, inter alia, that it 
 
“1.  [c]ondems the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including 
most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international 
peace and security in the region; 2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the 
threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and 
expresses the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that 
the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.” 
 
By this resolution, the Security Council for the first time recognized the indirect 
relationship between repression – mass and gross violations of human rights – and 
the maintenance of international peace and security.193 Similarly, the Security 
Council Resolution 794 (1992) on the collective humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia stressed the “magnitude of the human tragedy” as warranting the 
intervention. This proves that the UN bodies do not consider human rights violations 
as a matter solely of domestic concern, but rather linked to the maintenance of 
international peace. Accordingly, it is now commonly agreed upon that art. 2 (7) no 
longer represents an obstacle to humanitarian interventions and few, if any, legal 
scholars contest that humanitarian interventions conducted under a UN Chapter 7 
mandate is incompatible with the Charter.194  
 
The holding that the promotion of human rights clearly ranked far below the practice 
of national sovereignty and peace at the enactment of the Charter is therefore not a 
decisive argument today. While, as we have seen, the Charter it self does not appear 
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to emphasise the importance of human rights, there is clear evidence now that 
international law and UN practice increasingly sets aside the necessity of state 
sovereignty in order to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights thus 
linking the protection of human rights to peace.  
 
Then, what implications do these developments have for the prohibition of force?  
 
Brenfors and Peterson hold that“…if a state violates human rights, its right to 
sovereignty is of a derogatory nature to the rights of its individuals.”195 The 
protection of the sovereignty of the state provided for by art. 2 (4) should accordingly 
be conditioned on the respect for human rights.196   Reisman concludes with the 
negative remark that sovereignty can never be used to “shield the actual suppression 
of popular sovereignty from external rebuke and remedy.”197  Proponents of a re-
interpretation of art. 2 (4) thus adopt the social contract philosophy: the state only 
exists because its individuals have consented to give up part of their autonomy in 
order to obtain collective goods.198  It is a mistake, they claim, to uphold the original 
sixteenth century theories of sovereignty as legitimating the unlimited supremacy of 
the monarchs of that time today.199 This feudal view is described as the “Hegelian 
myth” – “the illusion that a state is an ethical being capable of holding rights 
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a humanitarian intervention to restore the democratic and human rights of a people would be to upheld 
or vindicate, and not violate, the sovereignty and therefore be lawful, Reisman, M. “Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law“, AJIL, vol. 84 (1990) p. 866 
197 Reisman, M. “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law“, AJIL, vol. 84 
(1990) p. 872.  
198 Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 462 
199Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge London and New York 
(1997) p. 17, Whiteman, M.M. “Digest of International Law”, Vol.1, Department of State Publication 
(1963) p. 237 Reisman, M. “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law“, 
AJIL, vol. 84 (1990) p. 866.  Most prominent were Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean Bodin and Thomas 
Hobbes 
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independently of the rights of its individuals.”200 Instead, the state’s authority and the 
political right to sovereignty must bee seen to rest upon a “social contract” through 
which it is obliged to protect the right of the individuals.201 When these rights are 
violated, the state’s claim to sovereignty falls and so does the shield against 
intervention.202 In this view, sovereignty and human rights are not countering poles; 
an intervention for the protection of human rights supports sovereignty, the 
sovereignty of the people. In this vein, Reisman concluded that it was 
“anachronistic” to say that the United States violated Panama’s sovereignty in 1989 
by launching an invasion to capture its (allegedly) illegitimate head of state.203 
 
These contentions are morally unproblematic. In legal terms however, the problem is 
more complex.  
 
Firstly, this philosophical view of popular sovereignty, which in the past was largely 
supported in international law along with Grotius’ “just war” theory, and which 
could serve to justify “humanitarian interventions”, finds little substantial support in 
the material rules of current international law. By the emergence of the principle of 
non-intervention and shift in the 20th century to a policy of non-interference and 
attempts to outlaw war204, culminating with the introduction of the prohibition of 
force and the proclamation of state sovereignty in the UN Charter, these theories 
were left behind. 205 The inclination in the traditional concept of sovereignty and the 
strengthening of the popular sovereignty since the adoption of the Charter do not 
mean that democracy has displaced peace as the main concern of the UN Charter. As 
Chesterman holds in his critic of Teson, D’Amato and Reisman: 
                                                 
200 Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defense”, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 461, Abiew, F.K “ The Evolution of the Doctrine 
and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention”, Kluwer Law International (1999) p. 73, 74 
201 Tsagourias, N. “Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo and Legal Discourse: Self-deception or 
Self-Consciousness?” 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 11-32 (2000) p. 20 
202 See other statements by Vattel, Rawls, Mills and Teson in Tsagourias, Ibid. 
203 Reisman, M. “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law“,  AJIL, vol. 84 
(1990) p. 867, p. 874 
204 Supra section 1.3, Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 90 
205 Supra section 1.3. At least temporarily, we might add.  
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“No matter what role the concept of popular sovereignty plays in modern international law, it 
simply does not follow that the illegitimacy of one regime entitles a foreign state – any 
foreign state (though one can guess which foreign state) – to use force to install a new and 
more “legitimate” regime.”206 
 
This holding finds support also in the Nicaragua judgement. The Court held that, 
whatever the United States thought of the regime in Nicaragua,  
 
“adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary 
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of 
State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice 
of the political, social, economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua’s 
domestic policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the description given of 
them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the various actions of the 
Respondent complained of.”207 
 
Secondly, even if there is no doubt that the protection of human rights is of universal 
concern and that fundamental human rights are also erga omnes obligations deriving 
from jus cogens; even if the mechanisms established to protect these rights and the 
practice of UN bodies show that a state cannot hide behind their sovereignty to 
escape responsibility - or interference from the world community in terms of 
collective humanitarian intervention or countermeasures by individual states, it does 
not flow from this that art. 2 (4) now must be understood to allow the use of force to 
protect these rights. The question of permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention 
is far more complex than a problem of human rights vs. sovereignty.  
 
To opt for an interpretation of art. 2 (4) according to which unilateral use of force 
could be allowed to destabilise the peace would contradict and undermine the very 
spine of the UN Charter’s collective enforcement system and the principles upon 
                                                 
206 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 91-92 
207 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 para 263 
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which it is built. It is therefore questionable whether we are re-interpreting the 
Charter-provisions at all, or if it is a question of treaty modification.   
 
Moreover, the regulation of the use of force did not stagnate after 1945. Rather, the 
prohibition of force has strengthened its position as the cardinal rule of international 
relations. Parallel to the development of human rights, the inviolability and 
comprehensiveness of the Charter prohibition has been significantly reinforced and 
amplified through numerous General Assembly resolutions208 and, as stated in the 
Nicaragua case, now is a customary norm and maybe the clearest example of a norm 
of  jus cogens character.209 
 
The horizontal order of international law means that the establishment of 
mechanisms to enforce existing rights depend on the will of the states to do so. The 
protection of human rights is therefore limited to the remedies provided for in 
international law. The Court stated in the Nicaragua case that “where human rights 
are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form provided 
for in those conventions.”210 But neither the Charter nor other instruments have 
established a legal regime that allows the unilateral use force to protect violations of 
human rights. Notably, the International Law Commission’s Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2000)211 art. 50 I. A), 
states that the universal right to resort to countermeasures in the face of violations of 
obligations erga omnes, “shall not affect…[t]he obligation to refrain from the threat 
or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” 212 
 
                                                 
208 See infra section 5.3.2. Support for the authoritative status of these declarations can be found in art. 
31 (2) and (3) of the VCLT regarding subsequent agreements by the parties to a treaty and the effect 
thereof upon treaty interpretation.  
209 See discussion infra in section 5.3.2 
210 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 para. 267 
211 GA Res. 56/83 
212 The Drafts is generally predicted to reflect customary international law on the matter, Brownlie, I. 
(ed), Basic documents in international law, 5th ed, Oxford University press (2002), p.  300.  
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3.2.3 The shield of sovereignty and the risk of abuse 
Recently, some scholars have emphasised the danger of dismantling the polarity 
between sovereignty and human rights and advocated caution when arguing for 
intervention to protect human rights. One argument is that a concept of sovereignty is 
a double-edged sword that cuts both ways in the field of human rights.213 Intervening 
to protect the popular sovereignty, the rights of the civilians of a state, does not 
necessarily enhance the conditions for the people. This is often formulated as the risk 
of abuse when the decision to use force is left to the discretion of unilateral action.  
 
Bennoune highlights this by referring to the intervention carried out by an 
international coalition lead by USA, in Iraq in 1991.214 In terms of exercise of 
sovereignty, “[t]he Iraqi state offers [offered…] a Westphalian nightmare of 
absolutist ideas of sovereignty in their ugliest guise; an unaccountable state apparatus 
exercising absolute power over its terrified citizenry.”215 This included gross 
violations of human rights, whose cruelty defies the imagination.  
 
However, the regime of economic, social and military sanctions implemented in and 
against Iraq, partly pursuant to UN resolutions acting under Chapter 7 of the Charter, 
partly unilaterally by states or groups of states acting outside the scope of the UN 
resolutions216, to a large extent worked against their intentions, resulting in a 
worsening of the humanitarian situation. That action is held to be responsible for 
“one of the great human atrocities of our times — more deaths than caused by all the 
weapons of mass destruction throughout the twentieth century, in violation of the 
laws of war requirements of proportionality and of discrimination between 
combatants and civilians.”217 Bennoune says that “…the sanctions have devoured the 
most central of all human rights, the right to life, by impeding provision of essential 
                                                 
213 Bennoune, K. “Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Re-examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through 
the Lens of Iraq”, EJIL 13 (2002) p. 243-262 p. 254 
214 Ibid. p. 244 flg. 
215 Ibid. p. 249 
216 See section 5 
217 Ramesh T. “Global norms and international humanitarian law: an Asian perspective”, 
International review of the Red Cross No, 841, p. 19-44.  
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medical care or drugs, clean water and adequate nutrition. They have undermined the 
enjoyment of the full panoply of economic, social and cultural rights…They have 
also infringed upon the right to work, the right to earn a decent living, as well as 
other rights specifically pertaining to women and to children.”218   
 
This example discloses that in setting aside the shield of sovereignty there is the risk 
that ambiguous forms of humanitarian intervention are followed by a worsening of 
the human rights situation; it also shows that international peace and respect of the 
State’s sovereignty might be of even greater importance for the individuals than 
intervention to protect their human rights.  As Chinkin notes, “human rights give rise 
to responsibilities in states...These must encompass a duty not to make conditions 
worse for a threatened population and the obligation to respect the civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of all civilians.”219 Recent incidents show the 
risk of non-compliance to this duty when action is carried out unilaterally, and send a 
warning against allowing the unilateral enforcement of human rights in violation of 
state sovereignty.  
 
Furthermore, allowing for unauthorised unilateral action poses the general risk that 
states forcibly intervene in the domestic affairs of another state claiming that the 
target state is engaged in violations of human rights when in fact the intervening 
states are simply seeking to advance their own interests by altering the political or 
economic structure of the target state.220 Thus, in the words of Schachter, allowing 
for unilateral humanitarian interventions “would introduce a new normative basis for 
recourse to war that would give powerful states an almost unlimited right to 
overthrow governments alleged to be unresponsive to the popular will.”221 Needless 
to say, history has proven this risk to be a genuine one, and the contention that “[t]he 
                                                 
218 Bennoune, K. “Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Re-examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through 
the Lens of Iraq”, EJIL 13 (2002) p. 253-254 with further references 
219 Chinkin, C. “Kosovo: A “Good” or “bad” war, 93 AJIL (1999) p. 841-847  
220 Blockmans, S. “Moving Into Unchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 759-786 (1999) p. 781 
221 Schachter, O. “The legality of Pro-democratice Invasion”, AJIL,Vol. 78, (1984) p. 649 
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most powerful explanation for intervention in the international system continues to 
be state power”222 can hardly be contested in our year 2003. Without doubt, all 
modern states prefer to have an international legal basis for their actions on the 
international level, but not all considers this necessary. This statement from the 
former United States Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, about the position of 
NATO in the world community is illuminating: 
 
“We will try to act in concert with other organizations, and with respect for their principles 
and purposes. But the Alliance must reserve the right and freedom to act when its members, 
by consensus, deem it necessary.”223 
 
Sovereignty thus becomes a privilege of force, which is exactly what the UN 
Charter’s collective security system intends to avoid. Indeed, since gross human 
rights violations are considered a matter of universal concern, operations to ensure 
their protection should be carried out by the international community through the UN 
organs.  This provides the strongest safeguard against abuse of a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. In other words, action against a global threat requires a 
global decision. 
 
The abuse-argument was also put forward by the ICJ in its very first case, the Corfu 
Channel case. Mines in Albanian territorial waters in the North Corfu Channel had 
damaged British warships. The British responded by carrying out a minesweeping 
operation against the clearly expressed will of the Albanian government. The Court 
noted on the British interventions:  
 
"[t]his Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy 
of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses, and such as cannot, 
whatever the present defects of international organisation, find a place in international law. 
Intervention is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the 
                                                 
222 Krasner, “Sovereignty and Intervention”, 1995 p. 249, 
223 Simma, B. “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal aspects, 10 EJIL (1999) no. 1, p. 15 
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nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful states and might easily lead to 
perverting the administration of international justice itself." 224 
 
Henkin sums it well in these words: 
 
 “The principles of law, and the interpretations of the Charter, that prohibit unilateral 
humanitarian intervention do not reflect the conclusion that the sovereignty of the target state 
stands higher in the scale of values of contemporary international society than the human 
rights of its inhabitants to be protected from genocide and massive crimes against 
humanity…but reflect above all the moral political conclusion that no individual state can be 
trusted with authority to judge and determine wisely.”225 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Subsequent developments in international law do not yield a re-interpretation of art. 
2 (4) of the UN Charter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Corfu Channel case [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, 15 
225 Henkin, L.  in “Editorial Comments: Nato’s Kosovo Intervention, AJIL, v. 93, no. 4 1999 p. 824 
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4 Article 2 (4) and the effectiveness of the collective security system  
 
The contemporary political reality makes it difficult for the Security Council to reach 
a decision, and thus to give effectiveness to the Charter’s “collective use of force” 
mechanism for restoring international peace. The paralysis of the Security Council, 
usually connected to the cold war era and the antagonisms between USSR and USA, 
is again a likely reality. An example here is Kosovo, where the probable veto of 
Russia and China refrained the NATO members from seeking a resolution from the 
Security Council. In other words, the possibility exists that the collective security 
system may prove unable to address and prevent “threats to peace”, such as 
imminent humanitarian catastrophes, that might occur in the world-community in the 
future. Some scholars have argued that this inability of the Security Council to act 
effectively in the face of widespread human rights violations warrants an 
interpretation of art. 2 (4) according to which unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
permissible.226 Their theory is that should the Security Council be unable to act, a 
right of self-help, based on pre-Charter customary law, would then arise for 
individual states. As established above, however, it is arguable whether a customary 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention existed in the years before the Charter’s 
enactment. The existence of such must is presumed in the following analysis. 
 
Teson presents this line of argument in his recent study of humanitarian intervention. 
He finds support for the right of self-help in the doctrine rebus sic stantibus 
(fundamental change of circumstances).227 The prohibition on the use of force, he 
argues, only makes sense provided that the collective security arrangements 
contemplated in the Charter are effective. 228 Art. 2 (4) should thus be read as 
                                                 
226 Lillich, R.  ”Forcible self-help by States to protect human rights” (1967), Iowa Law Review p. 326, 
Reisman and McDougal, ”Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos”, in R. Lillich (ed.), 
“Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations” (Charlottesville: University press of Virgina, 
1973), p. 167ff. 
227 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 157  
228 Tesón, F.  “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 158 
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inclusive of an implicit condition, that the collective security system is able to 
function effectively. Failure of those security arrangements would then represent a 
fundamental change of circumstances that would allow to set aside the prohibition in 
art. 2 (4).  
In contemporary international law, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is enshrined in 
the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties  art. 61 para.1, which reads: 
“1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing 
at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not 
be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations 
still to be performed under the treaty. 
The application of the doctrine as enshrined in the VCLT art. 61 (1) is problematic 
on at least two points.  
Firs of all, it is doubtful whether one can say that it was not foreseen that the reality 
of world politics could make it difficult for the Security Council to act. The Security 
Council is a political organ constituted by five great world powers. By implementing 
a voting procedure that gives veto to these states, the possibility of inaction due to 
conflicting political interests must have been foreseen. As Brownlie remarks, the 
veto was part of the Charter and cannot be considered as a subsequent fault in 
performance.229 That this possibility was indeed in the thoughts of the drafters finds 
support in the preparatory works.230 
                                                 
229 Brownlie, I, “Thought on Kind-Hearted Gunmen”, Lillich (ed), “Humanitarian Intervention and the 
United Nations”, University of Virgina Press (1973) p. 141 
230 Constantine A. “The unilateral use of force by states in international law”, Ant.N.Sakkoulas 
Publishers Athens – Komotini 1997 p. 418 
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Secondly, can the Security Council’s intervention within the domestic sphere of 
another state have been an “essential basis” for the Member states to enter the 
Charter? The overarching construction of the Charter runs counter to this 
assumption. One of the main principles upon which the security system was built 
was indeed the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of another state, 
independently of the circumstances within that state.231 As noted repeatedly above, it 
was fundamental for the UN Charter to protect the sovereignty of the states as a 
means of waging armed conflicts. The fact that art. 2 (7) in today’s interpretation is 
considered to be no obstacle to intervention on humanitarian grounds, or that “threats 
to peace” have come to include also internal human right affairs, is not relevant in 
this context, as the real question is what circumstances the Member states had in 
mind at the time of the enactment of the Charter. There is no support for the 
contention that the majority of Member states of the UN have accepted this 
conditional validity of Charter obligations. We need only to recall the “Uniting for 
Peace” General Assembly resolution (1950), in which the General Assembly 
declares, inter alia:  
“Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of 
all the Member States…does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United 
Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and 
security.”232   
                                                 
231 UN Charter art. 2 (7) 
232 GA Res. 377(5), 302nd Plen.Meeting, 3 Nov. 1950. Despite its wording “uniting for peace”, which 
suggests that it is only through the General Assembly that actions potentially could be taken according 
to the Resolution, some scholars and states have argued that it allows for action by individual states 
when the collective security system fails. This argument is commonly presented together with an 
alleged subsidiary responsibility for the member states to maintain peace and security when the 
primary organ, the Security Council, is unable to do so, with reference to the UN art. 24, see e.g. the 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs Vollebæk in “Interpellasjonsdebatt”, Stortinget5, 27. april 
1999. This line of argument finds little support in legal doctrine. First of all, when art. 24 confers 
“primary responsibility” upon the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, it 
implies a secondary responsibility of other UN organs, notably the General Assembly, but not of the 
member States, see Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San 
Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 
121, p. 130 and Simma, B. “The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary”, vol. 1, Oxford 
University Press (2nd. Ed) (2002) p. 445ff. The ”Uniting for Peace” Res., moreover, is commonly 
understood to regard the relationship between the UN organs, i.e. the SC and GA,  and not between 
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Art. 2 (4) can therefore not be held to be conditioned on the effective functioning of 
the security mechanisms of the Charter and the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is not 
applicable. 
Practice of the ICJ also rejects an application of such a doctrine. In its first case, the 
Corfu Channel case 233, the ICJ was confronted with the question of what were to 
happen if the institutional mechanisms for conflict failed.234 The court, although 
without referring specifically to art. 2 (4), refused to consider “defects in the present 
organization” as justifying the British violation of Albanian sovereignty. The Court 
wrote235: 
“The court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as a policy of force, such as has, 
in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present 
defects in the international organization, find a place in international law.”236 
A further rejection of the doctrine rebus sic stantibus follows from the Nicaragua 
case.  Amplifying the Corfu Channel case, the Court said that the customary 
prohibition of the use237 of force is not “conditioned by provisions relating to 
collective security…[The principle of non-use of force should therefore] be 
thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an institutional 
kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-law plane of the Charter."238  
 
Thus, even if the provision in art. 2 (4) were conditioned upon the effectiveness of 
the collective enforcement system, the customary principle of non-use of force would 
                                                                                                                                          
the UN organs external organisations or individual states, Simma ibid. p. 450. And, the secondary 
responsibility that the resolution confer upon the General Assembly is generally held not to include 
the competence to authorise humanitarian intervention or recommend any use of force, which would 
otherwise be unlawful, see Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: 
From San Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 
(2001) p. 121, p. 131. 
233 Corfu Channel case [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, p. 15 
234 See facts in section 3.2.3. 
235 Quoted also in section 3.2.3. 
236  Corfu Channel case [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, p. 35, emphasis added 
237 See infra section 5.3.2 for a discussion of the customary principle of the prohibition of force 
238 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 para. 188 
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be in the way for unilateral use of force because the doctrine rebus sic stantibus does 
not apply to the customary rules.  
 
The ineffective functioning of the Security Council must thus be abandoned as an 
argument of a customary right of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
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5 Is article 2 (4) modified by subsequent state practice? 
5.1 Introduction 
The task of this section is to see whether the prohibition of the use of force in art. 2 
(4) is modified through state practice subsequent to the enactment of the UN Charter 
and must now be considered to permit unilateral use of force to protect fundamental 
human rights.  
 
A treaty can be subject to modification. This flows from the contractual aspect and 
horizontal structure of international law. A modification can take place through the 
formal mechanisms of modifications or amendments as provided for in a treaty239, or 
it can be informal as a consequence of development in state practice subsequent to 
the treaty has entered into force. The relevant issue in thesis is informal 
modification.240  
 
Section 2.2.2 drew the line between subsequent practice as a factor in the 
interpretation of the treaty and as a means of modifying a provision. The distinction 
was drawn between practice that develops sub lege, which becomes a factor in the 
interpretation, and practice that develops contra legem, which might lead to an 
informal modification of the treaty. The interpretative discourse ruled out any 
unilateral use of force as compatible with the scope of art. 2 (4). The incidents of 
“humanitarian interventions” in apparent violation of art 2 (4) occurred since the 
enactment of the Charter are thus practice that develops contra legem.  
 
Informal modification as a result of subsequent practice can potentially take two 
forms. The first possibility is that a customary norm emerges and according to the 
principle of lex posterior or lex specialis changes or takes the place of an existing 
                                                 
239 As for the Charter, see arts. 108 and 109 
240 Formal modification of the UN Charter has never taken place. 
 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention and article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter          69 
   
treaty-rule.241 The modified rule will in this case be a new norm of customary status 
retaining validity outside the treaty regime and thus bind also third states that are not 
parties to the treaty. The practice constituting the modification would have to satisfy 
the requirements of a customary process.242   
 
Secondly, it may be possible that state practice develops within a treaty regime. This 
is characterized by a practice between the parties to the treaty that reflects a new 
common will among the parties and thus suggests a modification to the existing 
treaty rule. This new modified rule, however, will not acquire validity outside the 
treaty context.   
 
Consequently, insofar as the original treaty rule is expressing customary law, a 
modification of the norm would require a subsequent practice that fulfils the 
requirements to customary law.   
 
5.2 Informal modification 
There is no explicit regulation of informal modification of treaties in international 
legal doctrine. The only situation in which the Vienna Convention of the Law of the 
Treaties deals with the impact of subsequent state practice is with respect to the 
interpretation of treaties243 and with respect to the emergence of a jus cogens 
norm.244 Art. 64 reads 
 
“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is 
in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates”. 
 
                                                 
241 International customary law and treaties are as legal sources equal, the prevailing source in case of 
conflict depends on other factors, notably the character of the individual norms. A consequence of the 
normative equality between customary law and treaty law, subsequent customary law can modify 
treaty based on the principles of lex posterior or specialis. A customary rule may also exist before or 
parallel to a treaty rule and prevail over the latter based on lex specialis. 
242 See infra in section 5.4 
243 VCLT art. 31.3 b) and supra in section 2.2.2 
244 art. 64 
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This article indicates that at least one potential category of subsequent state practice 
may have significant effects on pre-existing treaties.245 
 
However, the ILC, in its 1966 Draft articles, seem to have anticipated that treaty 
rules could be modified through subsequent state practice also outside the scope of 
art. 64.  In the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of the Treaties, art. 38 provided:  
 
A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing 
the agreement of the parties to modify its provision.246 
 
The article prescribed the manner in which a modification can take place within a 
treaty-regime. However, this clause did not receive the necessary support to be 
included in the in the VCLT.247 This did not mean that a principle of informal 
modification of treaties by subsequent practice was rejected, but that the VCLT was 
not considered appropriate to deal with this issue. One main reason for this was that 
the drafters did not want to touch upon the complex relationship between custom and 
treaties.248 Accordingly, most scholars hold that the drafting process did not affect 
pre-existing norms on treaty modification. As Karl puts it, “at least, there was no 
adverse opinio juris against…[informal] modification of treaties249. Similarly, 
Akehurst holds that it is “difficult to interpret the deletion of Article 38 as a clear 
rejection of the view that existing law allowed a treaty to be amended by subsequent 
practice.”250  
 
                                                 
245 Byers, M. “Custom, Power and the Power of Rules”, Cambridge University Press (1999) p. 175 
246 YBILC 1966-“, s. 236, 
247  Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 58 
248 Bowett, R. “Treaty revision in the light of the evolution of the customary international law”, 5 
AJCIL, 1993, p. 88 
249 Karl, Vertrag und Spatere Praxis im Volkrecht, Berlin, 1983, s. 389, referred in Sevastvik, P. 
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The issue of informal modification of treaties should therefore be dealt with under 
the rules of customary law. The preamble of the VCLT reads, inter alia, that ”the 
rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions not regulated 
by the provision of the present Convention.”  
 
In legal doctrine it is widely agreed that modification of treaty rules through the 
process of customary law or subsequent practice is possible. However, uncertainty 
and disagreement exist as to the mode in which such changes could occur.251  
 
In its commentary to its 1966 draft articles, the ILC refers to two cases in which 
international tribunals have recognised a process of modification based on state 
practice or customary international law.252 In the Temple Case253 the ICJ wrote: 
 
“The Court considers that the acceptance of the Annex 1 map by the Parties caused the map 
to enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it…In other words, the Parties 
at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement which caused the map line, in 
so far as it may have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant 
clause of the treaty.”254  
 
Similarly, in its interpretation of the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 
between France and the United States, the arbiters held that the relevant treaty had 
been modified “by virtue of an agreement that implicitly came into force.”255 
 
Numerous examples of multilateral treaties being modified by subsequent practice 
may be found in the Law of the sea256, where concepts such as the 12 mile territorial 
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sea and the 200 mile exclusive economic zone both emerged from subsequent state 
practice, significantly modifying provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High seas and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial sea and the Contiguous 
zone.257 
 
The Namibia Advisory opinion258 dealt with the impact of subsequent practice for the 
understanding of the UN Charter art. 27 (3). Art. 27 (3) provides that decisions of the 
Security Council on non-procedural matters “shall be made by an affirmative vote of 
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The 
question before the Court was whether Security Council Resolution 284 lacked the 
concurring votes of the permanent members as required by art. 27 (3) as a result of 
abstentions by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and thus would have to be 
considered invalid. The Court held: 
 
“the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period supply abundant 
evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken by members of the Council, in 
particular its permanent members, have consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of 
voluntary abstention by permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of 
resolutions…This procedure…has been generally accepted by Members of the United 
Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization.”259  
 
Legal doctrine is split upon the question whether this“ general practice” amounted to 
an authoritative interpretation of the Charter, or a modification as a result of practice 
within the treaty regime or the emergence of a new customary law.260  
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(2002) p. 384 
257 Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 58 and Byers, M. 
“Custom, Power and the Power of Rules”, Cambridge University Press (1999) p. 173-4 
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Wolke holds that the subsequent practice in question in the Namibia Opinion, ”being 
clearly at variance with the text of Article 27 (3), cannot be considered merely as its 
interpretation, but also as its amendment by accepted practice, that is custom…One 
must conclude, then, that precisely law-making by custom still constitutes an 
invaluable means for the development of international law in the present multiplied 
and divided society of States.”261  
 
The same view is held by Byers and Eek.262 Kontou, on the other hand, claims that it 
is “a case of treaty modification by subsequent practice between the parties…The 
treaty is, as a result, modified by means of tacit agreement between the parties [and 
not] by the emergence of a new rule of general customary law…”263 He refers to the 
second mode of informal modification of treaties sketched above in section 5.1, that 
is, modification by practice within a treaty regime by means of tacit agreement or 
common consent.264 
 
It is not necessary to resolve this debate in this context. As Byers maintains, most of 
the cases mentioned in this paragraph could “concern either the interpretation of 
treaties or the modification of the internal procedures of an international organization 
by its member States, rather than recognition of the possibility of the customary 
process modifying treaty rules through subsequent State practice.”265 With regard to 
the Namibia Opinion, Chesterman rightfully points out that the ruling itself is 
ambiguous, referring both to “interpretation” and “practice.”266  
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We can conclude that informal modification of treaties based on subsequent state 
practice is possible, although the mode of modification is not at all as clear as 
sketched in the introductory paragraph to this section. In relation to the UN Charter, 
the threshold of requisite practice would be high.267   
 
5.3 The question of modification of article 2 (4) of the UN Charter 
5.3.1 Initial comments on the possible modification of the rule in art. 2 (4) 
Because the provision in art. 2 (4) is generally held to express a jus cogens 
customary norm268, it is not sufficient for a modification of the principle it enshrines 
that the practice by the parties to the UN Charter (despite the fact that this includes 
virtually all states) reflects a “common consent”. To modify also the customary 
norm, the subsequent practice would have to reflect a “general practice accepted as 
law”, in the sense of the Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38. 269 
Furthermore, the question arises whether and how a norm of jus cogens character can 
be modified. The next section discusses the status of the prohibition of force as 
customary law and jus cogens. 
 
5.3.2 Article 2 (4) as customary law and jus cogens. The Nicaragua case 
The Court held in the Nicaragua case that “[t]he principle of non-use of 
force…may…be regarded as a principle of customary law.”270 This is also the 
predominant view in international legal doctrine. As held by the International law 
Commission in 1966: 
 
                                                 
267 Chesterman, S.  “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 60, note 101  
268 Ibid. See also section 2.1 
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“the great majority of international lawyers today unhesitatingly hold that Article 2, 
paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the 
modern customary law regarding the threat or use of force.”271 
 
The norm in art. 2 (4) and the customary principle are not just coexisting, but also 
independent of each other.272 The Court said in the Nicaragua case that ” [t]he 
existence of identical rules in international treaty law and customary law has been 
clearly recognized by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases…”273 Such 
rules “retain a separate existence.”274 Indeed,  “[b]oth the Charter and the customary 
international law flow from a common fundamental principle outlawing the use of 
force in international relations”275, but the customary law has developed under 
influence of the Charter “to such an extent that a number of rules contained in the 
Charter have acquired a status independent of it.”276 Thus, the Court noted, 
“customary international law continues to exist and apply, separately from 
international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an identical 
content.”277  
 
These passages provide an authoritative statement on the customary status of the 
prohibition of force. The Court noted on the degree of overlapping between the 
customary and treaty norm:  
 
“The Court does not consider that, in the areas of law relevant to the present dispute, it can 
be claimed that all the customary rules which may be invoked have a content exactly 
identical to that of the rules contained in the treaties which cannot be applied by virtue of the 
United States reservation. On a number of points, the areas governed by the two sources of 
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law do not exactly overlap, and the substantive rules in which they are framed are not 
identical in content.”278  
 
Charter and customary norms are thus not completely identical. But in essence, there 
is no marked divergence between them, for customary international law has 
solidified under the influence of the Charter.279 
 
As a confirmation of the validity as customary law of the principle of the prohibition 
of the use of force in art. 2 (4), the Court declared in the Nicaragua case that 
 
“it [the prohibition of the use of force] is frequently referred to in statements by State 
representatives as being not only a principle of customary law but also a fundamental or 
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law Commission, in the course of its work 
on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that “the law of the Charter 
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a 
rule in international law having character of jus cogens.”280  
 
In determining the tenor of customary international law, the Court furthermore relied 
on the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, unanimously adopted in 1970 by the UN General Assembly.281 The 
Declaration reiterates the language of art. 2 (4) and refers to “[e]very state” and not 
just “[a]ll Members”282, and therefore, in the words of the Court, “the adoption by 
States of this text affords an indication of their opinio juris as to customary 
international law on the question.”283  
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Since 1945 the UN General Assembly has issued numerous resolutions that amplify 
the prohibition in art. 2 (4) and shed light on the opinio juris as to its customary 
existence.284  In addition to the Declaration on Friendly Relations these include, 
inter alia, GA Res. 375 (1949) on the Rights and Duties of States, which states, that 
every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs 
of any other state; GA Res. 2131 (1965) on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, which 
says that “[n]o state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the state or against its political, economical and cultural elements, are 
condemned”; GA Res 3314 (1974), the definition of aggression, stating that “no 
consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, 
may serve as justification for aggression”. The two latter Resolutions were also held 
to evidence the customary principle of non-use of force in the Nicaragua case.285 
Worth mentioning is also statement by the G77 group, constituted nowadays by 133 
non-industrialised states, which after the Kosovo incident declared that unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is illegal under international law.286 
 
Dinstein rightfully points out that the Court only stressed the opinio juris of states, 
and not their actual behaviour. The widespread inter-state force contrary to the 
prohibition of the use of force has lead some scholars to deny the existence of a 
customary status of art. 2 (4). T.M. Frank contended in 1970 that the prohibition of 
the use of force is “eroded beyond recognition”287 in world affairs. Other scholars 
considered exaggerate this contention indeed. The fact that the prohibition is violated 
does not suggest the disappearance of the norm itself.288 As Schachter notes, “no 
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state has ever suggested that violations of art. 2 (4) have opened the door to the free 
use of force.”289 
 
The Court held in Nicaragua that  
 
“[i]t is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question 
should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency, from the use of force…The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary law, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court 
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such 
rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have 
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as an indication of the recognition of a new rule.”290 
 
There is therefore every reason to contend that the norm in UN art. 2 (4), or at least 
major parts of it, express a customary rule.  
 
The next question is whether the norm in art. 2 (4) and customary law prohibiting the 
use of inter-state force is a norm of jus cogens character.  
 
According to VCLT art. 53, a norm of jus cogens is  
 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” 
 
The article makes it clear that a norm of jus cogens character can only be altered by a 
norm carrying the same status. This raises the threshold for evidence of an emerging 
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customary norm still higher. VCLT art. 64 states that “[i]f a peremptory norm of 
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that 
norm becomes void and terminates.” This wording would seem to indicate that 
should a new customary jus cogens norm emerge, it would terminate the UN Charter. 
This would be an absurd result of the dynamic of international law, and could not 
sensibly apply to the UN Charter.291 
 
The VCLT does not give any indications as to whether art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter is 
a jus cogens norm. But the International Commission identified in its commentary on 
the draft of the VCLT the prohibition on the use of force as “a conspicuous example” 
of jus cogens.292 The commission’s position was quoted by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case.293 See also separate opinion of President Singh: “the principle of non-use of 
force belongs to the realm of jus cogens.”294 The same view was confirmed in the 
separate opinion of Judge Sette Camara295. This holding appears to be generally 
accepted in international legal doctrine.296 However, it is not certain whether the 
peremptory content of the ban coincides perfectly with the rule in art. 2 (4).297 
 
We can thus conclude that the principle enshrined in art 2 (4) is customary law and 
jus cogens. A modifying norm would therefore have to satisfy the requirements to 
the formation of customary law and also carry jus cogens status. 
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5.3.3 The Nicaragua case and the rejection of the use of force to protect human 
rights 
The possible emergence of a customary legal right of intervention was examined in 
the Nicaragua case.  
 
The case concerned Nicaraguan allegations against the United States concerning 
certain US military actions (including laying of mines in Nicaraguan territorial 
waters), and the American support given to the contras. The USA did not actually 
invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify its support for the contras, 
but the court nevertheless considered whether the protection of human rights might 
provide a legal justification for the US use of force.  The part of the judgement which 
deals with this question provides an authoritative statement of the law on this area; it 
has proved relatively uncontroversial among commentators.298 As the Charter of the 
United Nations was ruled inapplicable due to an American reservation to its 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court, 299 the dispute was resolved on the basis 
of the corresponding obligations in international customary law.300  The Court found, 
by twelve votes to three, that by its acts in support of the contras, the US had acted 
contrary to customary law, notably, the principle of non-intervention, and that it by 
the attacks on the Nicaraguan territory they had violated the customary principle of 
the prohibition of the use of force.301  
 
On the question of modification of the customary principle of non-intervention, the 
Court initially held that  
 
“The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct prima facie inconsistent with the 
principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as justification. Reliance 
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by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in 
principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary international law.”302 
 
In the view of the court, no such reliance could be proved.  The Court asserted that 
states do not have a right of collective armed response to acts that do not constitute 
an armed attack303, thus excluding any other exceptions to the prohibition of the use 
of force than the right to individual or collective self-defence.304 As to the allegations 
that Nicaragua had violated human rights, the Court noted that “where human rights 
are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form…provided 
for in the conventions themselves.”305 And in any event, while the United States were 
free to form their own opinion about the Nicaraguan respect for human rights,   
 
"the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. 
With regard to the steps actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly 
humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil 
installations, or again with the training, arming and equipping of the contras. The Court 
concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua 
cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal strategy of the respondent State, which is 
based on the right to self-defence.306  
 
This passage of the ruling appears to be the Court’s first (implicit) reference to 
humanitarian intervention. In its broad terms, most notably the first phrase in para 
268 “the use of force could not be the appropriate method…”, the ruling narrowly 
construed the ability of states to resort to armed force307 thus rejecting any right to 
use force to protect human rights. The Courts conclusion based on the customary 
norm of non-intervention and non-use of force thereby supports the conclusion 
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derived in section 2 from a textual interpretation of the conventional rule in art. 2 (4). 
The general view among legal writers is also that the position of the Court is 
inconsistent with a customary international law right of humanitarian intervention.308 
 
However, some scholars have argued for a narrow interpretation of the judgment.309  
If read isolated from the rest of the judgement, the second part of para 268, starting 
with the words “[w]ith regard to the steps actually taken…’, could be read to indicate 
that the Court did not on a general basis rule out the use of force to protect human 
rights, but rather rejected that the use of force was adequate in this case based on the 
specific facts in question. One of the proponents of this view is Teson. He submits 
that the courts holding “should be interpreted as declaring only the illegality of 
disproportionate forcible intervention to restore democracy”310 and that the holding 
on the use of force to protect human rights can only claim authority for that specific 
case: i.e. that the forcible methods applied by the US were not justified upon the facts 
present in this case because a) the human rights violations were not grave enough 
and b) the methods applied were not adequate.311 This view is to some extent also 
supported by the Court’s holding concerning the provision of humanitarian aid. To 
this respect the Court observed that there could be 
 
“no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another 
country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful 
intervention, or in any other way contrary to international law.”312 
 
Chesterman opposes these narrow readings of the case. He admits on the basis of the 
Court’s holding on the lawfulness of humanitarian aid that “the judgement can (at 
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best) be said to be not incompatible with a narrow right of humanitarian 
intervention”, but adds that “such an analysis is merely directed at importing 
common-law principles to narrow the ratio of the case, however, and in no way 
provides support for the contrary position.” 313 Legal theory is generally sceptic to 
the narrow view of the Court’s holding. Teson’s interpretation is, in Simma’s words, 
“clearly too narrow”, if not subtle. The Court’s holding on the specific measures 
applied in this case must be read against the background of the whole judgment, after 
which the Courts standing should be understood to proscribe the use of force for 
humanitarian motives as a matter of principle, rather than as one of “scale and 
effects.”314  
 
Thus, the Nicaragua case provides a strong argument against the holding that the 
norm enshrined in art. 2 (4) is modified by new customary law.  It confirms the 
conclusion derived from the textual interpretation, that unilateral use of force to 
protect human rights is not permissible under international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
313 Chesterman, S.“Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 62 
314 Simma, B. “The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary”, vol. 1, Oxford University Press 
(2nd. Ed) (2002) p. 131 n. 156. See also Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University 
Press (2001) p. 62 who rejects the view that the judgment can be confined to its statements on the 
disproportionate use of force. 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention and article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter          84 
   
5.4 The formation of customary law and unilateral humanitarian intervention  
5.4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the alleged “humanitarian interventions” 
conducted after the enactment of the Charter and to examine whether they have 
developed a customary norm modifying art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter. A full-scale 
survey of state practice, however, is not within the scope of this thesis. Numerous 
studies have been conducted during the last years, most of which are already 
mentioned in this work. This section is based on the main observations in these 
studies. The most prominent and interesting studies conducted recently are probably 
that of Chesterman, who rejects the emergence of such a doctrine, and that of Teson, 
who supports it. They seem to stand out for the two main contrasting views, although 
Teson’s view is one of a small minority among legal scholars.315   
 
5.4.2 The starting point: “General practice accepted as law” 
Art. 38 of the ICJ Statutes defines international customary law as a “general practice 
accepted as law”. “[G]eneral practice” refers to the objective element and  “accepted 
as law” to the subjective element of international custom. The objective element is 
constituted by what the States actually do – the convergence of state actions, while 
the subjective element consists of the States conviction that they follow the practice 
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as a matter of law.316 The objective and subjective criteria are cumulative: the raw 
material of customary law – the state practice or diuturnitas – can only transform 
into customary law if it is accompanied by an opinio juris – a convinced legal 
obligation. This was first held in the North Sea Continental Shelf case and reaffirmed 
in the Nicaragua case: 
 
“[f]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount to a 
settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitates.”317 
 
The minimum requirement to the emergence of a customary norm that could lead to 
a modification of art. 2 (4) making unilateral humanitarian intervention permissible 
would thus be that incidents of interventions must amount to a “general practice” and 
be conducted upon the conviction that the conduct is according to the law.  As it 
regards a custom in derogation of maybe the most fundamental rule of international 
law, the prohibition of force, the evidence of practice and opinio juris would have to 
be overwhelming.318 The practice and opinio must also be evidence that the new rule 
carries a jus cogens status, according to VCLT art. 53, which raises the threshold for 
evidence of the countervailing norm still higher.319 
 
5.4.3 “General practice” – the objective element 
5.4.3.1 Introduction 
There are two main issues that need to be addressed regarding the objective element 
in the formation of customary law. First, it is necessary to determine what constitute 
“state practice”. Second, the requirements to this practice must be determined. Three 
                                                 
316 Villiger, M.E. ”Customary International Law and Treaties”, Kluwer Law International (1997) 
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factors are generally discussed in relation to the latter question; generality; 
uniformity or consistency of practice; duration.320   
  
5.4.3.2 “State practice” 
The Court stated in the Continental Shelf case (Libya vs. Malta) that the substance of 
customary law must “be looked for primarily in the actual practice…of States.”321  
We must therefore look for evidence of state practice in the alleged precedents of 
“unilateral humanitarian intervention”.  These state conducts can only be considered 
“state practice”, and thus potentially evolve in to a customary norm, if they answer to 
the definition outlined in section 1.2. 
 
The majority of legal commentators hold that few, if any of the alleged incidents of 
humanitarian intervention can be considered genuine state practice as such. Simma 
sums it up with these words: “State practice in the past two centuries, and especially 
since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian 
intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all.”322 
 
Most cases of interventions are questionable as precedents because they have been 
conducted upon utterly mixed motives and very often other than humanitarian. 
Section 1.2 specified that for a state conduct to be regarded as a genuine unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, one criterion is that it must be based on predominant 
humanitarian motives.   
 
There are three cases of post-war interventions commonly held out as the best 
examples of unilateral humanitarian intervention.323 However, most surveys regard 
                                                 
320 Brownlie, I. “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) 5th edition p. 
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even these cases as rather dubious evidence of state practice. These are the Indian 
intervention in Pakistan in 1971, The Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 and 
the Vietnam intervention in Cambodia in 1978-1979.  
 
India intervened in East Pakistan after Pakistani forces had committed large-scale 
human rights violations and had forced some 10 million people to flee to India, 
following East Pakistan calls for autonomy and notably their “Declaration of 
Emancipation”.  India defeated Pakistan in the ensuing war, resulting in the 
independence of Bangladesh. This incident is commonly described as the clearest 
case of unilateral humanitarian intervention in this century; “an almost perfect 
example”, according to Teson .324 The presence of humanitarian interests was clear. 
However, the Indian initial claims of humanitarian intervention was later withdrawn, 
or at least blurred by other decisive motives.325 India ultimately relied on a more 
traditional ground of self-defence326 on the ground of a Pakistani “pre-emptive” air 
strike against Indian airfield on the 3 December the same year. India’s concern for 
the regional balance of power vis-à-vis Pakistan is said to have been equally 
apparent.327 The majority of the delegates to the UN General Assembly were of the 
opinion that India had interfered within the internal affairs of Pakistan and asserted 
that India had to respect the sovereignty of Pakistan, calling upon India to withdraw 
its forces. 328 
 
In 1979, Tanzania intervened in Uganda, overthrew the terror-regime of Idi Amin 
(which had resulted in the estimated loss of 300.000 lives), and installed a new 
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327 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 139 
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government. The outcome is generally considered as being a welcome result. Apart 
from the humanitarian motives, a territorial conflict concerning Kagera, a region of 
Tanzania annexed by Amin, served as a background for the conflict. The military 
action by Tanzania is therefore held to be, at least partly, precipitated by Uganda’s 
violation of Tanzanian sovereignty. The element of self-defence is thus present.  Few 
states criticised the intervention.  
 
In 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, expelled the Khmer Rouge regime and installed 
a new government. Also this intervention is commonly regarded as having had a 
positive impact on the region. Apart from the humanitarian elements constituted by 
the genocide committed by Khmer Rouge with the result of close to 2 million deaths 
among Cambodians, the intervention seems to have been motivated also by the 
numerous violations of the Vietnamese boarder by Khmer Rouge forces.  The 
intervention was then partly one of self-defence, and partly a revolutionary war in 
support of the Cambodian people. Indeed, no right of humanitarian intervention was 
asserted by Vietnam.  The adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning the 
action was blocked by Soviet veto, but most western states protested against the 
intervention. As Chesterman notes, nearly all states making speeches during 
meetings in the Security Council regarding the conflict (January 1979) referred to the 
principle on non-interference in internal affairs. The Norwegian delegate stated that 
Norway had “strong objections to the serious violations of human rights committed 
by the Pol Pot Government. However, the domestic policies of that government 
cannot, we repeat, cannot, justify the actions of Vietnam over the last days and 
weeks”329 Several General Assembly resolutions condemned the intervention.330  
 
From post cold war practice we need to mention the US/UK/French intervention to 
protect the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq in 1991-1999 after the Iraq-Iran conflict and the 
NATO operation in Kosovo 1999 carried out to put an end to the escalating 
oppression by the Serbian regime against the ethnic Albanians in the region.  
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In response to the Iraqi repression of the Kurds and Shiites following the end of the 
Iraq-Iran conflict, the Security Council eventually passed Resolution 688 (1991). The 
Council called on Iraq to end the repression of its civilian population and to allow 
access to international humanitarian organisations. The resolution was not passed 
under Chapter 7 of the Charter and did not authorise the use of force to help the 
Kurds and the Shiites. Despite this, British, US and French troops proclaimed safe 
havens and forced Iraqi troops to leave these areas. Later no-fly zones over the north 
and the south were established and forcibly controlled, which included air-strikes 
against Iraqi missile sites following confrontations between Iraq and the coalition 
planes controlling the no-fly zones.   
 
Prior to the NATO action in Kosovo, the Security Council had determined that the 
humanitarian situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to international peace and 
stressed the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.331 Stated intentions to use 
veto by China and Russia, however, hindered a Security Council authorisation for 
military intervention. There seems to have been widespread recognition in the 
international community that NATO’s campaign was carried by legitimate 
humanitarian motives.332  
 
Most other incidents are generally held not even to be arguable as “state practice” of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention. Several interventions are at best discussed 
under the heading “protection of nationals abroad” and thus fall outside the concept 
of humanitarian intervention as defined in section 1.2. These include the Entebbe 
operation (1976: Israel conducted a rescue operation of the remaining 104 passengers 
taken hostage by Palestinian terrorists at Entebbe, Uganda) and the three 
Belgian/US/French interventions in Congo/Zaire (“at worst they were post-colonial 
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adventures to secure access to mineral resources in the newly independent state.”333). 
Others are excluded because the humanitarian elements were rather dubious. Often 
mentioned here are the US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965; on that 
occasion President Johnson revealed the real objectives of the intervention in the 
famous words: The American nation cannot, must not and will not permit the 
establishment of another communist government in the Western hemisphere), 
Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-90).334 
 
This traditional analysis is by some scholars held to be mistaken. Brenfors Peterson 
says that “[i]t is clear that additional motives do not pose an obstacle, as long as 
humanitarian considerations are present.”335 The problem with this argument is that 
the action then looses its character and nature of a humanitarian intervention.  
Because of the risk of abuse of such a doctrine, these actions must be excluded from 
the concept.336  
 
Another critical argument is that the traditional process of evidencing state practice 
emphasises too much what states claim to be doing in favour of what they really do. 
In ascertaining actions by states, some scholars claim that only real-acts, and not 
verbal statements, constitute state practice.337 D’Amato explained: “given the 
simplicity of verbal invention, and the infinite variety of sentences that can be use to 
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explain or mis-explain events, I find it unpersuasive to base a theory of customary 
law upon what states say.”338  
 
Teson, drawing on the work of D’Amato, holds that whether the verbal conduct of 
states indicate that an intervention is carried out upon motives other than 
humanitarian, is not relevant.339 He wants to disregard verbal acts completely.340 
Instead, he emphasises the importance of giving the best possible interpretation of 
the situation regarded as a whole.  Referring to the Indian intervention in East-
Pakistan he contends that “the important point here is not so much whether the 
Indian leaders harboured selfish purposes along with humanitarian ones, or in what 
proportion those purposes blended as an efficient cause of the intervention…but 
rather that the whole picture of the situation was one that warranted foreign 
intervention on grounds of humanity.”341 The reasoning seems to be that verbal acts 
are disregarded because the state in fact could have conducted the interventions upon 
humanitarian motives. And whether or not they could have, is to be interpreted by 
courts, writers, governments and historians.342  
 
This view has been met with vast critic and finds little support in legal doctrine.343  
Notably, Teson’s logic of the situation or contextual judgment, to be interpreted by 
observers of the law, runs counter to the traditional view that “customary law is 
created by states, not by academics.”344 According to this view, what counts are the 
reasons states choose to lay down, not what reasons commentators can infer. 
                                                 
338  D’Amato, A. “Response”, 80 AJIL (1986) p. 148-150 
339 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 192-193 
340 But he does not disregard verbal in-actions, i.e., passive conduct (!), see infra section 5.4.4 
341 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p. 208 
342 Tesón, F. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality”, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York (2nd. Ed) (1997) p.193 
343 see e.g Akehurst, M. “Custom as a source of international law”, BYIL (1974-75) p. 7-8, 
Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 63, Murphy, S.D., 
“Humanitarian intervention – The United Nations in an Evolving World Order” (1996) p. 83-281, 
Villiger, Mark E. ”Customary International Law and Treaties”, Kluwer Law International (1997) 
(2nd.ed) p. 20 
344 Akehurst, M. “Letter”, 80 AJIL p. 147 (1986) 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention and article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter          92 
   
By limiting the relevant state practice to what states actually do would also seem to 
require actual violations of customary law. In short, acts contrary to existing rules 
represent violations of those rules, while statements do not; it would accord great 
weight to acts of intervention contrary to the customary rules of non-use of force and 
no weight to protests, resolutions and declarations condemning them.345 It would thus 
be contrary to the paramount principle of peaceful persuasion and settlement of 
disputes. It would also marginalize less powerful states within the international legal 
system because the restrictive view disregards state expressions in the form of 
General Assembly resolutions, in which every state (read: virtually the whole world-
community) has one vote, thus ensuring the equal possibility of states to influence 
the outcome.  This restrictive view of state practice is furthermore inconsistent with 
the evolution of international relations and the flexibility of customary law. As 
Villiger remarks, “a restricted view of State practice has not yet accommodated 
sufficiently the immense changes of the past 50 years in the State community, 
regarding its international organization and the multilateral treaty making 
process.”346  This means taking into consideration the importance UN and similar 
bodies have attained for states as a fora in which to express them selves collectively 
or individually and thus influence the development of international law. 
 
A restrictive view of state practice is furthermore inconsistent with the term 
“practice”, as per art. 38 of the ICJ-Statute, which does not distinguish between 
various state conduct. It is general enough to cover any act or behaviour of a State.347 
This broad understanding of state practice is also supported in ICJ practice.  
 
The court relied in the Nicaragua case explicitly on statements from politicians, 
General Assembly resolutions, constitutions of international organisations, and 
treaties, when establishing the customary nature of the prohibition of the use of 
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force.348 See also the Asylum case, where the Court relied on “official views” and 
treaty ratifications in determining that a “constant and uniform usage” did not 
exist.”349 In the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco case, 
diplomatic correspondence was reviewed to determine a right to exercise consular 
jurisdiction.350 Similarly, The International law Commission listed in 1950 the 
following forms of “Evidence of Customary International Law”: treaties, decisions of 
national and international courts, national legislation, opinions of national legal 
advisers, diplomatic correspondence, practice from international organisations.351 
 
Thus, when analysing state practice of “unilateral humanitarian interventions”, 
evidence must be sought for in “any act or statement by a State from which views 
can be inferred about international law.”352   
 
It is on this base that most surveys of practice have been conducted and which 
reveals few if any genuine cases of unilateral humanitarian intervention that 
potentially could develop a norm of customary international law.353 Most of the 
interventions have been conducted upon grounds of self-defence or protection of 
nationals abroad, and in the few cases were humanitarian ends were sought, the 
allegations and behaviour of the states disclose that humanitarian ends were almost 
always mixed with other underlying less laudable motives for intervening.354  The 
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NATO operation in Kosovo stands out as the clearest example of an intervention 
based on predominant humanitarian motives. 355 
 
5.4.3.3  “General” Practice. 
The term “general” attached to practice refers to the number of states that have to 
contribute towards the customary rule and, hence, introduces a quantitative 
dimension into the ascertainment of customary law.356 “General practice” is a 
relative concept and cannot be defined abstractly.357 It should not be understood in 
absolute, universal terms. As expressed in the Restatements, “a practice can be 
general even if it is not universally accepted; there is no precise formula to indicate 
how widespread a practice must be, but it should reflect wide acceptance among the 
states particularly involved in the relevant activity.”358 Similarly, the Court held in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf case that: 
 
“an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question…, State practice, 
including that of States whose interest are especially affected, should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform.”359 
 
Thus, practice does not have to be universal, but representative.360 A practice can be 
recognised as “general” when concurrence is reached among the states that are most 
affected or interested in a particular issue and the overwhelming majority of 
remaining states do not raise objections.  
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It is not always easy to determine which states that are specially affected by a 
practice. However, practice related to the prohibition of the use of force in the UN 
Charter art. 2 (4) is clearly of equal concern for every state.  This would imply a high 
threshold of generality in order for a customary rule to emerge.  
 
Then, interventions carried out in violation of the prohibition of force would have to 
be accepted by virtually the whole world community. This does not mean, though, 
that the doctrine must be positively accepted by nearly every state. It is clear that the 
absence of protests under certain circumstances can be part of a general practice, thus 
allowing for a rule to emerge. The interpretation of state’s passive conduct in relation 
to the alleged “humanitarian interventions” is a highly debated issue and a matter of 
controversy in the international legal doctrine. The significance of passive conduct is 
discussed hereafter, in relation to the element opinio juris in section 5.4.4 
 
5.4.3.4 Uniformity and consistency of practice 
In the Asylum case, the ICJ suggested that a customary rule must be based on a 
“constant and uniform usage.”361 Later, the Court held in Nicaragua:  
 
“It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question 
should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other’s internal affairs. The 
Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the 
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, 
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent 
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule.”362  
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Accordingly it is clear that complete uniformity to the rule is not required, but major 
inconsistencies will prevent the creation of a customary rule.363 Minor 
inconsistencies, however, as also noted in the Fisheries case (UK vs. Norway)364, do 
not prevent the emergence of a customary rule. The relativity of the requirement 
implies that the greater the inconsistencies, the larger the amount of practice 
supporting the rule is required. Vice versa, it is possible that a small amount of 
practice that has lasted a short period of time may amount to customary law if there 
is no practice that conflict with that rule.  
 
5.4.3.5 Duration 
There is no standard length of time and the ICJ does not (anymore) emphasis the 
importance of duration as such. As held by the Court in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case on the question whether art. 6 (2) in the Continental Shelf Convention had 
developed into customary law 11 years after the adoption of the convention: 
 
“even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and 
representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself…Although the passage 
of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new 
rule of customary law…within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice…should have been both extensive and virtually uniform.”365     
 
The time element is hence a relative requirement366, and customary law may evolve 
out of a short period of time. One example is the rapid development of the 
continental shelf doctrine. The required duration depends on the circumstances, 
notably the two other objective criteria, the consistency of the practice and the 
generality the practice.  Hence, the lesser the generality and the greater the 
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inconsistency of a practice, the longer duration in time is necessary for a practice to 
develop into customary law.367 It might be that the sensitive and controversial nature 
of an issue is also a factor likely to influence the length of the period of time 
required.368 Accordingly, considering the controversy in legal doctrine and among 
states as to the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, and the large body of 
customary law and treaty law supporting the prohibition of the use of force, a 
customary right of humanitarian intervention is ineligible for any theoretical 
development of instant custom. A considerable period of time is likely to be 
required.369 
 
5.4.4 “Accepted as law” – the subjective criterion 
The second element necessary to the formation of customary law is a psychological 
element.  The state practice must be “accepted as law”. As held in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case and reaffirmed in Nicaragua, this criterion implies that the 
states in their practice must have behaved so that their conduct is 
 
“evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit 
in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.”370 
 
The participants in the state practice must thus be convinced that their acts reflect a 
legal obligation. Moral or political motivations are not sufficient.  
 
The presence of opinio juris is what transforms diuturnitas into customary law. This 
requirement thus carries the aptitude to evolve inherent to the nature of customary 
law, thereby allowing a new norm, such as a right to unilateral humanitarian 
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intervention, to emerge out of the practice of states. In this process, opinio juris 
serves to distinguish violations of the customary rule from subsequent modification 
of the rule. Hence, state practice that answer to the definition of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention outlined in section 1.2, cannot develop a customary 
modification of the principle of non-use of interstate force unless it is accompanied 
by opinio juris.  Without opinio, the practice must be interpreted as breaches of the 
existing customary rules outlawing such actions. 
 
However, the opinio juris does not have to be universal. The Court held in the Lotus 
case that “[t]he rules of law binding upon states…emanate from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles 
of law.”371 The reference to the “free will” of the states indicates the consent based 
decision-making procedure in international relations and the expression “generally 
accepted” indicates that it is consensus based.    
 
The relativity of the formation process is seen also in this criterion. The ascertaining 
of opinio juris requires a balancing of state actions and state reactions, of claims and 
protests and the abstentions from protests.372 An utterly widespread opinio juris 
accompanied with lack of opposing views can allow a state practice to develop into 
customary law quickly. On the other hand, if supporting and opposive attitudes to the 
practice are fairly balanced, a formation process is difficult and slow.373 This 
assessment of opinio juris was adopted in the Nicaragua case regarding the possible 
modification of the principle of non-intervention. The Court held that “[r]eliance by a 
State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared 
in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of a customary law.”374 
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372 Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge London and New 
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373 Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, Routledge London and New 
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How is opinio juris to be ascertained further is a debated issue and a cause of 
disagreement on a customary doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention. From 
the traditional point of view, seeing customary rules as rules of international law 
deriving from the own free will of the states375, as express statements of states – “the 
articulation of a rule of international law”376 – should represent the clearest evidence 
of opinio juris.377 The lack of such express statements in relation to alleged 
humanitarian interventions is commonly put forward as the main and decisive 
argument against the existence of opinio juris with respect to a customary rule 
allowing for the doctrine. .378 As Joyner notes,  “[t]he lack [in state practice] of clear 
reliance on a legal right of humanitarian intervention to legitimise the use of force 
against another state manifests a fatal deficiency of relevant opinio juris by the 
intervening states involved.”379  
 
In none of the cases during the cold war era was the doctrine invoked as the primary 
justification for the interventions and most of the interventions were met with vast 
                                                 
375 Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ Rep., Ser. A, No. 9, p. 4, see supra in this section 
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resort to force.” 
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144, Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 87, Schachter, O. 
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critic in the world community.380 The grounds upon which the intervening states 
ultimately relied was instead self-defence or protection of nationals abroad.381  
 
The UK, US and France did neither offer any consistent legal justification for their 
actions in Iraq in the period 1991-1991. No doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
was put forward in the Security Council. Outside the Security Council, however, the 
UK formulated maybe the first openly support by a state of a doctrine of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that “we 
believe that international intervention without the invitation of the country concerned 
can be justified in cases of extreme humanitarian need. This is why we were prepared 
to commit British forces to Operation Haven, mounted by the coalition in response 
to the refugee crisis involving the Iraqi Kurds. The deployment of these forces was 
entirely consistent with the objective of SC Res. 688.”382 This was immediately the 
only clear open disposal of the doctrine among the intervening states. The operations 
were generally claimed to be “in support of” or “consistent with” Security Council 
resolution 688, notwithstanding that this resolution from the strictly legal point of 
view could not justify the use of force, or as “necessary means” to limit the capacity 
of Iraq to oppress its own people.383 Self-defence was also invoked as a justification 
for some of the actions. Clear legal arguments, however, remained absent. The 
actions were not condemned by the Security Council or the General Assembly.  
 
Neither does the NATO action in Kosovo, the clearest case of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention in the post-cold war era, indicate any radical change in the 
opinio juris. NATO did not as an organisation present a principled legal justification 
of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the action was not openly based on any specific 
                                                 
380 In relation to the Grenada case, the legal advisor to the US Department of State said explicitly that 
the United States “did not assert a broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention”, thereby disclaiming 
any right of such a doctrine, see AJIL (1984) p. 664 
381 See section 5.4.3.2 
382 “UK Materials on International Law”, 63 BYIL (1992) p. 824 
383 “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, 93 AJIL (1999) p.; 
470 at p. 478, Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 199-206, 
Gray, C. “International Law and the Use of Force”, Oxford University Press (2000) p. 30 
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rule of law at all.384 Rather, NATO put forward that the action was legitimate on 
humanitarian considerations and alleged implicit Security Council mandate in SC 
Res. 1199 and 1203. 385 The German Foreign Minister Kinkel said that NATO, 
because of the state of humanitarian necessity in which the international community 
found itself in the Kosovo case, acted in conformity with the “sense and logic” of the 
resolutions that the Security Council had managed to pass.386 This resembles the Iraq 
situation. Rather than operating as an explicit source of legal authority, Security 
Council resolutions are seen as one policy justification among others.387 The UK 
seems to have been the only NATO Member to invoke a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, but also here motives are mixed up with alleged support found in 
Security Council resolutions. In the Legality of Use of Force brought to he ICJ 
following the hostilities in Kosovo, and raised by Jugoslavia against ten of the 
nineteen NATO members, Belgium was alone among the respondent states to allege 
a doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention, and, notably, as a secondary 
argument388 and mixed up with alleged support in SC Resolutions and arguments of 
necessity.389 This reluctance to formulate a clear legal justification for the action 
                                                 
384 Rytter, J.E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
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other states were that the action was necessary to avert humanitarian catastrophe, threats to the 
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discloses the desire to avoid setting a precedent that could lead to an erosion in the 
prohibition of force and abuse by other states in the future.390 As the German Foreign 
Minister  Kinkel said before the Bundestag: “the decision of NATO [on air strikes 
against the FRY] must not become a precedent. As far as the Security Council 
monopoly on force is concerned, we must avoid getting on a slippery slope.”391 The 
Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium similarly said in a statement of 25 September 
1999 at the UN General Assembly that “[w]e hope that resorting to force without the 
approval of the Security Council will not constitute a precedent.”392 Following the 
end of the hostilities, the majority of states and legal scholars have made it expressly 
apparent that they regard NATO action in Kosovo as illegal.393 
 
However, some scholars argue that evidence of opinio cannot depend only on such 
statements and reject the traditional analysis conducted above.394 Villiger says that in 
                                                                                                                                          
(1997), para 51.The article sets out two requirements. The act, read: the humanitarian intervention, 
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330, p. 359, Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001), Rytter, J.E. 
“Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo – and 
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some cases the ascertainment of the opinio could be a result of the evaluation of the 
context surrounding the individual instances of practice, and of other conditions 
required for a customary rule.395 Some support for this can be found also in ICJ 
practice. The Court noted in the North Sea Cases in this regard that the opinio may 
also be sought among the instances of practice themselves, which “must..be carried 
out in such a way, as to be evidence” of the legal conviction. 396 
 
However, according to Brownlie and Chesterman, ICJ practice shows that the 
required evidence of an opinio depends upon the nature of the issue and the 
generality of the practice.397 In case of a widespread state practice or a consensus in 
the literature, whose character as law is uncertain, positive statements of opinio 
might not be required.398 But this is not the situation with unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. Considering the few instances of state practice (or the lack of such) that 
can be considered genuine unilateral humanitarian interventions and the controversy 
of the doctrine, the clearest expression of opinio must be required.  
 
An authoritative statement as to this requisite is implied by the Nicaragua case, 
where the Court commented on the possible modification of the principle of non-
intervention:  
 
“[The Court has no] authority to ascribe to states legal views which they do not themselves 
advance. The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct prima facie inconsistent 
with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as a 
justification.”399  
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However, the Court found that the grounds offered by USA for their intervention in 
Nicaragua were partly “statements of international policy” and thus “not an assertion 
of rules of existing international law”, and partly based on “classical” self-defense.400 
The USA had not justified their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention 
or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition.”401 A customary right of 
intervention was therefore rejected.402 
 
It can therefore not be correct, as some scholars put forward, to neglect statements 
completely and leave in its place the logic of the situation (Teson) or 
“circumstances” (Brenfors Peterson) from which the opinio must be derived or 
assumed, as if commentators were best seat seeing what the states really meant or 
should have meant.403 Teson, illustrating his argument with the Uganda case, says: 
“[i]t matters little that the Tanzanians (wrongly) thought that they were acting in self-
defence or said that they were so acting. The logic of the situation, revealed by world 
reactions, tells a different story: that the observance of a minimum of human rights is 
a precondition of the protection afforded governments by article 2 (4) of the United 
Nations Charter.”404 Similarly, regarding the Indian intervention in East-Pakistan in 
1971, Teson holds that whether India did or did not “articulate humanitarian reasons 
as justification for her military action…or whether…India amended her initial pro-
interventionist statements in the U.N., are matters of little importance. The important 
point here is not so much whether the Indian leaders harboured selfish purposes 
along with humanitarian ones, or in what proportion those purposes blended as an 
efficient cause of the intervention…but rather that the whole picture of the situation 
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was one that warranted foreign intervention on grounds of humanity.”405 Or, in the 
words of Brenfors Peterson: “the explicit invocation of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is not decisive, as long as the actual circumstances warrant such 
action.”406 
 
This view is not compatible with the holdings based on ICJ practice outlined above. 
It is furthermore questionable as it seems to do away with the notion of opinio juris 
(the state’s conviction that it is adhering to a legal norm) completely.407 Under 
section 5.4.3.2  it was explained why such a view of state practice and opinio juris 
cannot be upheld. The restrictive view furthermore ignores widespread protests put 
forward by individual states408 and important General Assembly resolutions 
confirming the illegality of inter-state use of force.409 Resolutions from the General 
Assembly are, in virtue of the “one state one vote” voting procedure and 
accessibility, a “source” that can be used to shed light on the opinio juris of states.410 
Indeed, General Assembly Resolutions were important as evidence of a customary 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force in the Nicaragua case.411 Taking such 
statements into consideration furthermore accommodates that states need not break 
the law to influence or change it, which appears especially important in matter of use 
of force.412  
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It is surprising that the proponents of the restrictive view of state practice and opinio 
juris still makes so much out of what states do not say. Teson, for example, argues 
that because of the lack of protests and critical debates in the Security Council, in the 
General Assembly and in the world community at large, “the Tanzanian action was 
legitimised by the international community”413, which “virtually approved the 
Tanzanian intervention.”414  This is held to be an exaggeration.415 One thing is to say 
that states, for moral or political reasons, acknowledged Tanzania’s right to defend 
themselves; another is to hold that the use of force on that occasion was considered 
legal. 
 
Generally speaking, silence may, over a period of time and provided that other states 
could reasonably have expected the state to react, be regarded as tactic acceptance of 
the practice in question.416 However, tactic approval of the practice does not 
necessarily evidence opinio juris.417 Thus, the fact that certain actions appear to be 
tolerated by the international community is an insufficient basis on which to ground a 
right of humanitarian intervention.418 As touched upon before, this would be 
especially questionable considering the controversy of the doctrine and the nature of 
specific actions as unilateral use of force.  
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The same applies to the argument that failure of the General Assembly and the 
Security Council to condemn interventions (of the three “best cases” only Vietnam 
was condemned explicitly) is evidencing opinio juris.419 As Gray remarks, there is a 
distinct reluctance in the Security Council and the General Assembly to express 
explicit condemnations that might be read as findings on responsibility. If the failure 
to condemn by the SC can be attributed to one state using its right to veto, evidence 
of legality is even less convincing and would privilege powerful states in an 
unacceptable way.  As regards the failure in the General assembly to condemn 
interventions, the argument could be turned: Why did none of the actions receive 
General Assembly approval? 420  
 
We can then conclude that what counts when evidencing opinio juris in relation to an 
emerging doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention must be the descriptions 
and justifications which a state invokes for its actions, not the descriptions and 
justifications which academics invent. As regards the passive conduct by states, it 
must be agreed with Rytter when he says that “[e]ven if a large number of states 
remain silent over a period of time in the face of conduct of relatively few states, new 
customary law is unlikely to be established, unless the practice of the few is 
consistent and supported by clear evidence of opinio juris.”421 
 
Judged by these standards, a customary doctrine of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention must be rejected because of the lack of clear legal justifications upon 
such a doctrine in the cases of alleged humanitarian interventions after 1945. The 
incidents of intervention should therefore be interpreted as violations of the 
prohibition of force rather than as evidence of the formation of a new rule.  
                                                 
419 See e.g. Brenfors M., Petersen M. “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention – A defence”, 
Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 449-499 (2000) p. 489, Abiew, F.K. “ The Evolution of the 
Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention”, Kluwer Law International (1999) p. 120 
420 Schachter, O. “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1991) p. 
124 
421 Rytter, J. E. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to 
Kosovo – and Beyond”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 Nos. 1-2 (2001) p. 121, p. 156 
 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention and article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter          108 
   
6 Conclusions and assessments 
 
The problem under consideration in this thesis has been the legality of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention under art. 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter.  Four 
alternative lines of argument have been examined and all rejected as legal 
justifications for the doctrine.  
 
First, unilateral humanitarian intervention was ruled incompatible with the textual 
understanding of art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  Prima facie, the prohibition is limited 
to force against “the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” or 
force that in “any other manner is inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter.” 
However, the addition in fine must be understood to be a “catch-all” provision that 
includes the phrase “territorial integrity or political independence” and renders any 
unilateral use of force that is inconsistent with the Charter’s main purpose of 
preserving peace illegal use of force. Any doubt as to whether this was the original 
intent of the founding states was removed by an analysis of the Charter’s system and 
its normative logic. The preparatory works of the Charter confirmed this view. Then, 
from a static interpretative approach, in which the original intention of the drafters is 
deemed supremely authoritative in matter of legality of the use of force, unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is not permissible.    
 
Secondly, it was proven that subsequent developments in international law do not 
warrant a re-interpretation of art. 2 (4). This discussion took as a starting-point the 
evolution of two cardinal principles of international law that are confronted by a 
humanitarian intervention:  the principle of state sovereignty, which underpins the 
prohibition of inter state force, and the universal protection of human rights.  There is 
wide support in international legal doctrine for the holding that fundamental human 
rights are erga omnes obligations deriving from jus cogens and that their protection 
is a matter of concern to the whole world community. It is also clear that the 
normative revolution in human rights and the mechanisms established to their 
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protection are eroding the sovereignty of the state.   However, this does not affect the 
continued validity of the comprehensiveness of art. 2 (4) because it could not be 
shown that states have accepted the right to use force to protect these rights, in the 
absence of an authorisation under Chapter 7 by the Security Council or a situation of 
self-defence.422  Rather, ICJ practice and state practice qua General Assembly 
resolutions confirm the comprehensiveness of the prohibition of force and its status 
as jus cogens and are evidence of widespread opinio juris for its parallel existence 
under customary law. Thus, notwithstanding the decline in the traditional concept of 
state sovereignty flowing from the growing concern and protection of human rights, 
the use of force as a means towards their protection remains illegal. Under this 
section it was also argued that discretionary unilateral use of force is not a preferred 
mechanism to resolve or remedy human rights problems and secure justice within a 
sovereign state. Such a rule would be bound to be abused, especially by the big and 
strong, and to pose a threat, especially to the small and weak.423 
 
Thirdly, it was shown that the deadlock of the Security Council did not represent a 
fundamental change of circumstances that according to the doctrine of rebus sic 
stantibus potentially could set the prohibition in art. 2 (4) out of force and thus 
permit unilateral humanitarian intervention based on a presumed pre-Charter 
doctrine. Apart from the fact that problems of efficiency in the collective security 
mechanisms were reasonably foreseeable and that intervention to protect human 
rights within a sovereign state was clearly not an essential basis for the Member 
states to enter the Charter, this argument is inconsistent with practice from the ICJ in 
the Corfu Channel and the Nicaragua cases.  Most notably, the Court stated in 
Nicaragua that the customary principle of non-use of force is not conditioned by 
provisions relating to collective security in the UN Charter, but retains a separate life 
in customary law.   
 
                                                 
422 Charney, J., “Commentary: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo”, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational law, Vol. 32, Nov. 1999, no. 5 at 1235, p. 1247 
423 Swedish delegate in the Security Council 1940th meeting, para 121 
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Fourth and finally, the modification of art. 2 (4) by a customary doctrine of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention was rejected because the instances of state conduct alleged 
to be compatible with such a doctrine did not suffice to establish a customary rule. 
The objective requirement of a “general practice” was not fulfilled since the 
interventions by and large were not carried out for predominant humanitarian 
motives. The state conduct also failed to satisfy the subjective criterion opinio juris 
because, despite the existences of widespread and well- documented violations of 
human rights in many of the cases, the states did not invoke a legal doctrine of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention as a legal justification of their actions. Even in 
the “best cases” of East-Pakistan, Uganda and Camodia, were the brutality of 
humanitarian atrocities represented a ground upon which a humanitarian intervention 
could have been invoked, the doctrine was ignored, and the states chose instead to 
rely on self-defense from an armed attack or the protection of nationals abroad. 
Neither the Iraq, nor the Kosovo interventions did indicate any radical change in the 
opinio juris. At best, these two incidents can be said to show an emerging opinio 
necessitatis among the intervening states424 thus disclosing a moral imperative to 
remedy humanitarian crisis with the use of force on a unilateral basis. Both 
operations were asserted by the intervening states to be necessary and legitimate out 
of political or moral reasons. The Netherlands government stated that “the terrible, 
unceasing human tragedy in Kosovo” left it “no other choice.”425 The Italian 
government similarly noted, in relation to Kosovo, that the use of force had been 
“inevitable”.426 This impelling moral and humanitarian necessity was shared also by 
other states.427 However, the magnitude of protests and legal criticisms; the emphasis 
among intervening states such as Belgium and Germany that the Kosovo episode 
                                                 
424 Cassese, A. “A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermneasures and Opinio Necessitatis”, 
EJIL Vol. 10 (1999) p. 791 at p. 797 
425 reported in Zappala, “Nuovi sviluppi in relazione alle vicende del Kosovo”, Rivista di diritto 
internazionalw (1999) p. 975-1004, at. p. 987, note 46 
426 reported in Zappalà, “Nuovi sviluppi in relazione alle vicende del Kosovo”, Rivista di diritto 
internazionalw (1999) p. 975-1004, at p. 986, note 42 
427 Cassese, A. “A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermneasures and Opinio Necessitatis”, 
EJIL Vol. 10 (1999) p. 791, at p. 798  
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should not set a precedent428, and the unwillingness to explicitly formulate legal 
justifications for the action, indicate that the legal controversy of such a doctrine still 
exists and that the opinio juris for a legal right to intervene is lacking. 
 
The main conclusion is therefore that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not 
permissible under current international law. 
 
     *** 
Then, returning to the quandary presented in section 1.4: is international law able to 
reconcile the restraints on the use of force in cases when the Security Council fails to 
act, with the increasing desire and need to protect civilians and combatants from 
widespread and severe infringements of human rights that arise from internal 
conflicts? The answer is, as this thesis has shown, no. Such a gap between what 
morality and justice demand and what is legally permissible might seem disturbing 
and leads us to ask: are there no situations where humanitarian atrocities are so grave 
that points of law become secondary to moral considerations; or, as formulated by 
Cassese, “should respect for the Rule of Law be sacrificed on the altar of human 
compassion?”429 The Kosovo case has shown that at least some states would give a 
positive answer to this question. This study does not share this position. One problem 
keeps emerging: the risk of abuse and possible ambiguous negative consequences 
when the decision of the use of force is left up to the discretion of unilateral action. 
This view is also reflected in the reluctance among states to explicitly invoke a legal 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as justification for their action, thus avoiding 
setting precedents that may seed the ground for a doctrine permitting unilateral 
action to protect human rights.  
 
This inability to realise justice represents a legal deficiency in international law and 
poses a serious challenge for the international community in the future. One possible 
                                                 
428 See supra section 5.4.4 
429 Cassese A. “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?”, EJIL 10 (1999) 23-30, p. 25 
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solution could be to recognise the moral imperative of protecting human rights and 
formalise criteria in a UN Charter amendment after which a unilateral forceful action 
to their protection could be carried about. Many attempts have been suggested to this 
respect. In addition to the pre-requisites of “predominant humanitarian purposes” and 
the existence of grave violations of fundamental human rights outlined in the 
definition in section 1.2, three criteria are commonly put forward: the exhaustion of 
peaceful remedies, the failure of collective action by the Security Council and 
proportionality.430 Amending the Charter’s regime on the use of force might, 
however, not be a sufficient lever to alter the principle enshrined in art. 2 (4) because 
the prohibition of force derives its peremptory nature not only from the conventional 
rule in art. 2(4), but also from the independently valid customary norm. But even if 
such an amendment legally would be sufficient, codifying a legal framework for 
unilateral action may, as Chesterman notes, not solve the problem.  State practice to 
date show that normative restraints do not prevent states from intervening on other 
grounds than pure humanitarian ones.431 And as we have seen, there is a great risk 
that the ends achieved by unilateral action to protect human rights do not coincide 
with the ends that ideally should be sought. This suggests the conclusion that the 
only feasible way in which the use of force can be used to secure justice is when 
carried out by the international community through the UN organs. But because of 
the decision-making process and the geo-political reality, the current structure of this 
security system makes it unable to cope with this. In order to reconcile the desire to 
provide “positive peace”, i.e. the realization of justice, with the necessity to limit the 
use of force and thus preserve the “negative peace”, it thus seems necessary to 
reform the procedures under which the UN decisions on the use of force are taken. 
432 The feasibility of this, however, depends on the ability to come to a political 
                                                 
430 See Chesterman, S. “Just War or Just Peace”, Oxford University Press (2001) p. 228-229, note 35 
with references 
431 Ibid. p. 231 and 236 
432 Charney lists some possible reforms that the UN might adopt:”a UNSC vote by a three-fifths 
majority but without the right to a veto by the permanent members; a restructured UNSC with more 
states added with or without veto rights; a UNGA vote by two-thirds majority (the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution); a rapid ICJ advisory opinion requested by the UNGA or a special organ of the UNGA or 
UNSC that would find that the specific situation makes a humanitarian intervention lawful…” 
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consensus, which, ironically, is the very problem why the existing mechanisms do 
not work. 
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